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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model of advertising in a diﬀerentiated duopoly
in which ﬁrms ﬁrst decide how much to invest in cooperative or predatory adver-
tising and then engage in product market competition (Cournot or Bertrand).
We then use this model, with endogenously determined type of advertising,
to explore the policy implications in the context of a Brander-Spencer third-
country model of strategic trade. We ﬁrst analyse optimal policies when gov-
ernments use both trade and industrial policies and show that these policies are
substitutes. We then study optimal policy when governments can use only one
policy instrument and show that industrial policy is robust, i.e., governments
will always use an advertising subsidy irrespective of the type of advertising
and form of market competition. More interestingly we show that for a range of
parameter values we also get robust trade policy in which governments always
use a trade subsidy irrespective of the type of advertising or form of market
competition.
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JEL Classiﬁcation: F13, L13
∗We would like to thank Jian Tong for detailed comments as well as participants in seminar at
Southampton for helpful discussions. The ﬁrst author gratefully acknowledges the ﬁnancial support
from the ORS Award Scheme, which the reference number is 2002037001,a n dt h es c h o l a r s h i p
provided by Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton. All the
remaining errors are, of course, our own.
†Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Highﬁeld, Southamp-
ton SO17 1BJ, The United Kingdom, jiema@soton.ac.uk.
‡Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton, Highﬁeld, Southamp-
ton SO17 1BJ, The United Kingdom, amu@soton.ac.uk.
11 Introduction
Strategic trade policy has become a core part of international trade policy analysis
since the seminal paper Brander and Spencer (1985) was published. However, de-
spite a voluminous literature since then, the policy implications remain controversial,
mainly because the ex ante trade policy recommendation is very sensitive to the ex
post market conduct.1 Recent studies, such as Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Maggi
(1996) and Leahy and Neary (2001) show that if ﬁrms engage in strategic investment
competition (e.g., for R&D or capacity) prior to product market competition, then
industrial policy, in the form of an investment subsidy, would be more robust than
trade policy. Neary and Leahy (2000) develop a general framework to analyse opti-
mal intervention towards dynamic oligopoly, emphasizing the implications of diﬀerent
kinds of government commitment, and point out that when ﬁrms make strategic in-
vestments prior to product market competition, the ﬁr s tb e s tp o l i c yc o m b i n a t i o n
should be designed for both proﬁt-shifting and correcting domestic ﬁrm’s strategic
behaviour to inﬂuence rival’s decision and domestic government’s decision (if possi-
ble), which is socially wasteful. They also argue that a general model may not be
useful in providing a general guide to policy making, and that it might be better to
conduct case studies of particular policy combinations. Advertising is a fruitful ﬁeld
for such a case study, since its policy implications in the context of strategic trade
policy have not been much explored.
In this paper, we ﬁrst construct a model of advertising in a diﬀerentiated duopoly.
This is modelled as a two-stage game, in which at the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms decide how much
to invest in cooperative advertising, or predatory advertising or both. According to
Church and Ware (2000 p. 566):
“One of the more important distinctions in the study of advertising is
between cooperative advertising, which increases demand for rival ﬁrms’
products as well as those of the advertising ﬁrm, and predatory advertis-
ing, which increases demand for the advertising ﬁrm only by attracting
customers away from its rivals.”
At the second stage they engage in product market competition.
We then analyse policy setting in the context of a Brander-Spencer third-country
model of strategic trade, beginning with the case where governments can set trade and
industrial policies, and then considering the cases where they can set only industrial
policy or only trade policy.
The main results of this paper are as follows.
First, ﬁrms will invest only in one type of advertising, which is determined by
the relative eﬀectiveness of the two types of advertising and the degree of product
diﬀerentiation. Second, when governments use both trade and industrial policies,
1Brander (1995) provides a comprehensive discussion on strategic trade policy models.
2these policies are substitutes. Third, new evidence is found to support trade policy.
When governments can use only trade policy, for a range of parameters, which can be
wide, trade policy in the form of a trade subsidy is similarly robust, i.e., governments
always use that irrespective of the type of advertising or form of market competition.2
Fourth, further evidence is found to support industrial policy. When governments can
use only industrial policy, it is robust, i.e., governments will always use an advertising
subsidy irrespective of the type of advertising and form of market competition.
An obvious question is how these results for advertising relate to results for other
forms of strategic investment, such as R&D. Cooperative advertising and R&D with
spillovers are similar in that they raise rival’s proﬁt, i.e., they both have positive
externality eﬀects. However, predatory advertising decreases rival’s demand hence
proﬁts and so has a negative externality eﬀect, which has no analogue in R&D.3
How do our results relate to other studies of advertising?4 In the classic paper
Dixit and Norman (1978) advertising shifts utility and demand, which raises problems
of evaluating welfare eﬀects.5 Becker and Murphy (1993) try to solve this problem
by treating advertising as a good that consumers purchase. They point out that
advertising can increase demand of a product because the advertised good and ad-
vertising are complements. This allows conventional welfare analysis of advertising.
In this paper we follow the approach used by Dixit and Norman (1978), and can
use this to analyse government policy, because our use of the Brander-Spencer third-
country model means we can ignore the welfare analysis of the eﬀects of advertising
on consumers.
Mantovani and Mion (2002) use a similar two-stage game analysis of advertising
as in the basic model of this paper. However, our paper diﬀe r sf r o mt h e i r si nt w o
respects. First this paper uses the basic model to examine the policy implications for
an open economy, whereas they use theirs to study the eﬀect of entry deterrence and
endogenous exit.6 Second, this paper considers both quantity and price competition,
whereas they consider only price competition.
2NearyandLeahy(2000)arguethatexportsubsidymaybeapracticalpolicyoption: “...itmay
be possible to evade the WTO prohibition on export subsidies (e.g., by providing export credits) but
budgetary constraints may preclude direct assistance to investment.” Moreover, in practice, WTO
does not prohibit the use of an export tax rebate policy, which is equivalent to the eﬀect of an export
subsidy.
3Intuitively, a ﬁrm’s production cost could not be increased by rival’s R&D investment. Moreover,
studies of R&D and strategic trade have not explored the implications for robustness of strategic
trade policy. It is an interesting question whether the robustness result obtained in the advertising
case carries over to the R&D case.
4Bagwell (2001) is a good introduction to the literature on economics of advertising.
5The representative criticisms can be found in Schmalensee (1986).
6There are some detailed diﬀerences. Mantovani and Mion (2002) treat advertising as a discrete
variable, while we treat it as a continuous variable. While we distinguish between cooperative and
predatory advertising they distinguish between the market enlargement and predatory eﬀects of
advertising. But if market enlargement dominates predatory eﬀects in terms of impact on rivals, we
call this cooperative, and vice versa for predatory.
3The paper is organized as follows. The basic model of advertising in a diﬀeren-
tiated duopoly is presented in Section 2 and analysed in Section 3. In Section 4 we
examine the policy implications of the basic model for an open economy. Section 5
concludes the paper and points out further extensions. All of the proofs, and the
design of simulation, and the discussion on the second order condition of welfare
maximization are presented in Appendix.
2B a s i c M o d e l
The basic model is characterized as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, two ﬁrms,
ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2, which produce a diﬀerentiated product respectively, decide simul-
taneously how much to invest in cooperative advertising, or predatory advertising, or
both. In the second stage they engage in product market competition.
Consumers
Assume that the representative consumer’s preferences are given by the quasilinear
utility function
U (x1,x 2,m)=u(x1,x 2)+m,
where x1 and x2 are the outputs of the two ﬁrms respectively and m is a num´ eraire
good. In addition,
u(x1,x 2)=a1x1 + a2x2 −
1
2
£
b(x1)
2 +2 x1x2 + b(x2)
2¤
,
where
ai = a[1 + µ(mi + mj)+ν (ni − nj)], (1)
a>0,b > 1,µ > 0,ν> 0,i =1 ,2,j=1 ,2,i 6= j.
ai measures the market scale for ﬁrm i and b represents the sensitivity of demand to
a ﬁrm’s own product. For simplicity, we assume that the sensitivity of demand to
the rival ﬁrm’s product is equal to 1.m i and ni are the respective cooperative and
predatory advertising levels of ﬁrm i. µ and ν evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the two
types of advertising respectively.
Denote by pi the price for each ﬁrm’s product. Then the indirect demand system
is given by
pi = ai − bxi − xj.
The corresponding direct demand system is given by
xi = αi − βpi + γpj,
where
αi = α
·
1+µ(mi + mj)+
µ
b +1
b − 1
¶
ν (ni − nj)
¸
, (2)
4and
α =
a
b +1
,β =
b
b2 − 1
,γ =
1
b2 − 1
.
This formulation implies that one unit of a ﬁrm’s cooperative advertising invest-
ment will increase own and rival market scale by aµ units when ﬁrms play Cournot
and by αµ =( a
b+1)µ units when ﬁrms play Bertrand; one unit of a ﬁrm’s predatory
advertising investment will make own market scale increase and rival market scale
decrease by aν units when ﬁrms play Cournot and make own market scale increase
and rival market scale decrease by α(b+1
b−1)ν =( a
b−1)ν units when ﬁrms play Bertrand.
To simplify notation, without loss of generality, we normalise ν =1 , and hence-
forth interpret µ as a measure of the relative eﬀectiveness of cooperative advertising.
Firms
Firm i maximizes proﬁt Πi. We assume that ﬁrms have the same CRS produc-
tion technologies, with cost function: Ci (xi)=cxi,i=1 ,2, where, for the usual
reason, a>c .The investment cost function of each ﬁrm is given by ci (mi,n i)=
1
2k(mi + ni)
2 , i.e., we suppose that there exists joint investment diseconomy for each
ﬁrm,7 where
∂ci
∂mi
=
∂ci
∂ni
= k(mi + ni),
∂2ci
∂m2
i
=
∂2ci
∂n2
i
=
∂2ci
∂mi∂ni
= k.
We make the following assumption on k.
Assumption 1 k <k<k, where
k =m a x {2k1,2k2,2k3,2k4},
and
k1 =
2a2bµ2
(2b +1 ) 2,k 2 =
2a2b
(2b − 1)2,k 3 =
2a2b(b − 1)µ2
(b + 1)(2b − 1)2,k 4 =
2a2b(b +1 )
(b − 1)(2b +1 ) 2,
and
k<∞.
It can be easily shown that k1 >k 3,k 2 <k 4. Hence k =m a x {2k1,2k4}.
The ﬁrst inequality in Assumption 1 sets the greatest lower bound on k and
ensures that in the investment stage of the game:
7It might be argued that such a formulation cannot capture the potential increasing-return-to-
scale eﬀects of advertising. However, the problem might not be so serious as it seems to be. If
advertising investment will incur a ﬁxed cost, then there will be an increasing-return-to-scale range
for investment. Clearly a ﬁrm will invest in advertising only within this range. If we make an
appropriate additional assumption on the ﬁxed cost appropriately, our analysis will still hold. Of
course, ﬁxed costs are one of the important factors determining market structure. However, it is not
the focus of this paper and we assume that the market structure is given.
51. the proﬁt function of each ﬁrm will be a concave function in its own choice,
2. the own eﬀect of any type of advertising will be greater than the corresponding
cross eﬀect.
The second inequality sets an upper bound on k to ensure that ﬁrms’ advertising
investments are not so low as to be negligible.
We now solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the basic
model.
3A n a l y s i s o f B a s i c M o d e l
We ﬁrst discuss the case where ﬁrms in the product market play Cournot and then
turn to the case where ﬁrms play Bertrand.
3.1 The Cournot case
In the last stage of the game, ﬁrm i maximizes its proﬁt function:
Π
C
i =( ai − bxi − xj − c)xi.
Note that at this stage the investment costs are sunk and as usual quantities are
strategic substitutes. The Nash Equilibrium is:
x
∗C
i =
a
£
1+µ(mi + mj)+
¡
2b+1
2b−1
¢
(ni − nj)
¤
− c
2b +1
. (3)
Moreover, we have p∗C
i −c = bx∗C
i . The eﬀects of the diﬀerent types of advertising
on the equilibrium quantity x∗C
i and equilibrium price p∗C
i are as follows.
∂x∗C
i
∂mi
=
∂x∗C
i
∂mj
=
aµ
2b +1
> 0,
∂x∗C
i
∂ni
=
a
2b − 1
,
∂x∗C
i
∂nj
= −
∂x∗C
i
∂ni
< 0. (4)
∂p∗C
i
∂mi
=
∂p∗C
i
∂mj
=
abµ
2b +1
> 0,
∂p∗C
i
∂ni
=
ab
2b − 1
,
∂p∗C
i
∂nj
= −
∂p∗C
i
∂ni
< 0. (5)
The equilibrium proﬁto fﬁrm i is:
Π
∗C
i = b
¡
x
∗C
i
¢2
.
We use that to replace the product market competition stage and get the reduced
extensive form game.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, ﬁrm i maximizes its proﬁt function in the reduced
extensive form game:
π
C
i = Π
∗C
i − ci (mi,n i).
6By Assumption 1, we ensure that the proﬁt function of each ﬁrm is concave with
respect to its own choice and then there exists a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium,
which is unique and stable.8
Lemma 1
1. If µ>2b+1
2b−1, there exists a symmetric equilibrium, in which both ﬁrms invest in
cooperative advertising. Cooperative advertising is a strategic complement and
makes rival’s proﬁti n c r e a s e .
2. If µ<2b+1
2b−1, there exists a symmetric equilibrium, in which both ﬁrms invest
in predatory advertising. Predatory advertising is a strategic substitute and
makes rival’s proﬁts decrease.9
From the speciﬁcation of the investment cost function, the marginal costs of in-
creasing any type of advertising by one unit are the same. Therefore, in order to
make the optimal investment decision, each ﬁrm compares the marginal revenues
from the two types of advertising and chooses the larger one. Given the equilibrium
of the subsequent competition, when µ>2b+1
2b−1, the marginal revenue from cooperative
advertising is greater than that from predatory advertising, and vice versa.
When ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising, the equilibrium value of cooperative
advertising is
m
∗C
i = m
∗C =
2a(a − c)bµ
(2b +1 )
2 k − 4a2bµ2.
It is easy to show that:
∂m∗C
∂a
> 0,
∂m∗C
∂b
< 0,
∂m∗C
∂c
< 0,
∂m∗C
∂µ
> 0,
∂m∗C
∂k
< 0.
Substituting the expression for m∗C into the expressions for the equilibrium quan-
tity x∗C
i and equilibrium price p∗C
i , we get their equilibrium values respectively,
x
∗C
i = x
∗C (m)=
(a − c)(2b +1 )k
(2b +1 )
2 k − 4a2bµ2,
p
∗C
i = p
∗C (m)=
ab +( b +1 )c
2b +1
+
4(a − c)a2b2µ2
(2b +1 )
£
(2b +1 )
2 k − 4a2bµ2¤.
When ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising, the equilibrium value of predatory
advertising is
n
∗C
i = n
∗C =
2a(a − c)b
(4b2 − 1)k
.
8Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)a n dN i k a i d o( 1968).
9Of course, if µ = 2b+1
2b−1, there exists a symmetric equilibrium, in which both ﬁrms invest in both
cooperative advertising and predatory advertising. We omit this case.
7It is easy to show that:
∂n∗C
∂a
> 0,
∂n∗C
∂b
< 0,
∂n∗C
∂c
< 0,
∂n∗C
∂k
< 0.
Substituting the expression for n∗C into the expressions for the equilibrium quan-
tity x∗C
i and equilibrium price p∗C
i , we get their equilibrium values respectively,
x
∗C
i = x
∗C (n)=
a − c
2b +1
p
∗C
i = p
∗C (n)=
ab +( b +1 )c
2b +1
.
3.2 The Bertrand case
In the last stage of the game, ﬁrm i maximizes its proﬁt function:
Π
B
i =( pi − c)(αi − βpi + γpj).
Note that at this stage the investment costs are sunk and as usual prices are
strategic complements. The Nash Equilibrium is:
p
∗B
i =
α
h
1+µ(mi + mj)+
¡
b+1
b−1
¢³
2β−γ
2β+γ
´
(ni − nj)
i
+ βc
2β − γ
. (6)
Moreover, we have x∗B
i = β
¡
p∗B
i − c
¢
. The eﬀects of the diﬀerent types of adver-
tising on the equilibrium price p∗B
i and equilibrium quantity x∗B
i are as follows.
∂p∗B
i
∂mi
=
∂p∗B
i
∂mj
=
αµ
2β − γ
> 0,
∂p∗B
i
∂ni
=
α
¡
b+1
b−1
¢
2β + γ
> 0,
∂p∗B
i
∂nj
= −
∂p∗B
i
∂ni
< 0. (7)
∂x∗B
i
∂mi
=
∂x∗B
i
∂mj
=
αβµ
2β − γ
> 0,
∂x∗B
i
∂ni
=
αβ
¡
b+1
b−1
¢
2β + γ
> 0,
∂x∗B
i
∂nj
= −
∂x∗B
i
∂ni
< 0. (8)
The equilibrium proﬁto fﬁrm i is:
Π
∗B
i = β
¡
p
∗B
i − c
¢2 .
We use that to replace the product market competition stage and get the reduced
extensive form game.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, ﬁrm i maximizes its proﬁt function in the reduced
extensive form game:
π
B
i = Π
∗B
i − ci (mi,n i).
By Assumption 1, we ensure that the proﬁt function of each ﬁrm is concave with
respect to its own choice and then there exists a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium,
which is unique and stable.10
10Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)a n dN i k a i d o( 1968).
8Lemma 2
1. If µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, there exists a symmetric equilibrium, in which both ﬁrms invest
in cooperative advertising. Cooperative advertising is a strategic complement
and makes rival’s proﬁti n c r e a s e .
2. If µ<2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, there exists a symmetric equilibrium, in which both ﬁrms invest
in predatory advertising. Predatory advertising is a strategic substitute and
makes rival’s proﬁtd e c r e a s e . 11
The rationale is the same as for Lemma 1.
When ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising, the equilibrium value of cooperative
advertising is
m
∗B
i = m
∗B =
2a(a − c)b(b − 1)µ
(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
2 k − 4a2b(b − 1)µ2.
It is easy to show that:
∂m∗B
∂a
> 0,
∂m∗B
∂c
< 0,
∂m∗B
∂µ
> 0,
∂m∗B
∂k
< 0,
and
∂m∗B
∂b
> 0,i f b < 1.6777,
∂m∗B
∂b
< 0,i f b > 1.6777.
Substituting the expression for m∗B into the expressions for the equilibrium price
p∗B
i and equilibrium quantity x∗B
i , we get their equilibrium values respectively,
p
∗B
i = p
∗B (m)=
a(b − 1) + bc
2b − 1
+
4a2 (a − c)b(b − 1)
2 µ2
(2b − 1)
£
(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
2 k − 4a2b(b − 1)µ2¤,
x
∗B
i = x
∗B (m)=
(a − c)b(2b − 1)k
(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
2 k − 4a2b(b − 1)µ2.
When ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising, the equilibrium value of predatory
advertising is
n
∗B
i = n
∗B =
2a(a − c)b
(4b2 − 1)k
,
which is equal to the equilibrium value of predatory advertising in the Cournot case.
Substituting the expression for n∗B
i into the expressions for the equilibrium price p∗B
i
and equilibrium quantity x∗B
i , we get their equilibrium values respectively,
p
∗B
i = p
∗B (n)=
a(b − 1) + bc
2b − 1
,
x
∗B
i = x
∗B (n)=
(a − c)b
(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
.
11Of course, if µ = 2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, there exists a symmetric equilibrium, in which both ﬁrms invest in
both cooperative advertising and predatory advertising. We omit this case.
9We summarize the main results of the analysis in the above two Subsections in
the following Proposition.
Proposition 3
1. Whatever the form of product market competition, cooperative advertising will be
present in equilibrium, if µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, cooperative advertising will be present in
equilibrium when ﬁrms play Cournot, while predatory advertising will be present
in equilibrium when ﬁrms play Bertrand, if 2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1 >µ>2b+1
2b−1, predatory
advertising will be present in equilibrium, if 2b+1
2b−1 >µ .
2. Whatever the form of product market competition, cooperative advertising is a
strategic complement and makes rival’s proﬁt increase, while predatory adver-
tising is a strategic substitute and makes rival’s proﬁtd e c r e a s e .
The intuition behind the ﬁrst part of Proposition 3 is fairly simple. When b is very
small, i.e., the degree of product diﬀerentiation is very small,12 only if the relative
eﬀectiveness of cooperative advertising is very large will cooperative advertising be
chosen in equilibrium. Otherwise, ﬁrms will invest in predatory advertising. In other
words, if the two products are very similar, a ﬁrm has a strong incentive to “steal”
rival’s market share. On the other hand, when b is very large, i.e., the degree of
product diﬀerentiation is very large, even if the relative eﬀectiveness of cooperative
advertising is very small, cooperative advertising will be chosen in equilibrium. The
reason is that the incentive to steal rival’s market share diminishes and each ﬁrm
wants to increase its own market scale.13
This completes our discussion of the basic model.
4 Policy Implications for an Open Economy
In this Section we will consider the policy implications of the basic model for an open
economy in a Brander-Spencer third-country model. From the viewpoint of an export
country, if there is unilateral intervention, what is the optimal policy?
We now consider a three-stage game in which we add an additional stage to the
start of the basic model. In this new ﬁrst stage, the government of country i sets its
policy and the potential policy instruments are trade policy, a subsidy s on output,
and industrial policy, a subsidy τ on advertising.14 We assume the opportunity cost
12According to Singh and Vives (1984), when the market scale of one ﬁrm is equal to that of the
other, 1
b2 is the measure of product diﬀerentiation in this case.
13See also Mantovani and Mion (2002).
14Note that trade policy has two eﬀects on the subsequent game. First, it will directly change the
equilibrium outcome of the product market competition. Second, it has an indirect eﬀect on the
competition as well by changing rival ﬁrm’s incentive to invest in advertising. Unlike trade policy,
industrial policy cannot directly inﬂuence the product market competition but has an indirect eﬀect
on that by changing rival ﬁrm’s investment incentive.
10of public fund is unity. The representative consumer and the market are now in a
third country.15
Before going further, note that ﬁrms’ decisions in the investment stage on whether
to invest in cooperative or predatory advertising are not changed by the policy in-
struments, since, as we have just seen, that decision depends only on the relative
eﬀectiveness of cooperative advertising and the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
In the following Subsections we examine the ﬁrst best policy combination, second
best industrial policy and second best trade policy.
4.1 First best policy analysis
In this case, the government uses diﬀerent instruments for diﬀerent targets, in par-
ticular, trade policy s towards domestic ﬁrm’s quantity or price and industrial policy
τ towards domestic advertising investment. Given the equilibrium outcome in the
subsequent game, the government maximizes its welfare:
max
{s,τ}
W (s,τ)=πi (s,τ) − sxi (s,τ) − τIi (s,τ),
where πi is domestic ﬁrm’s proﬁta n dIi ∈ {mi,n i}. We shall assume that the welfare
function is strictly concave, so the following two conditions characterize the unique
optimal policy combination:
∂W
∂s
=
∂πi
∂s
(·) − xi −
∂xi
∂s
(·)s −
∂Ii
∂s
τ =0 , (9)
∂W
∂τ
=
∂πi
∂τ
(·) −
∂xi
∂τ
(·)s − Ii −
∂Ii
∂τ
τ =0 . (10)
Denote
D =
∂xi
∂s
(·)
∂Ii
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
∂Ii
∂s
, (11)
D1 =
·
∂πi
∂s
(·) − xi
¸
∂Ii
∂τ
−
·
∂πi
∂τ
(·) − Ii
¸
∂Ii
∂s
, (12)
D2 =
·
∂πi
∂τ
(·) − Ii
¸
∂xi
∂s
(·) −
·
∂πi
∂s
(·) − xi
¸
∂xi
∂τ
. (13)
We have
s =
D1
D
,τ=
D2
D
.16 (14)
15According to the terminology of Neary and Leahy (2000), we consider only “Government-Only-
Commitment Equilibrium” in this paper.
16It should be noted that according to Neary and Leahy (2000) the ﬁrst best policy combination
should not only do the proﬁt-shifting job but also should correct domestic ﬁrm’s strategic behaviour
to inﬂuence rival’s decision and domestic government’s decision (if possible), which is socially waste-
ful.
11We apply these general formulae for the ﬁrst best policy combination to the particular
cases to obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 In a Brander-Spencer third-country world the unique unilateral ﬁrst-
best intervention by the government of country i is as follows.
1. If µ>2b+1
2b−1, i.e., in the subsequent game Cournot ﬁrms invest in cooperative
advertising, both the optimal trade policy and the optimal industrial policy are
ambiguous. If µ<2b+1
2b−1, i.e., in the subsequent game Cournot ﬁrms invest in
predatory advertising, the optimal trade policy is a trade subsidy, whereas the
optimal industrial policy is ambiguous.
2. If µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, i.e., in the subsequent game Bertrand ﬁrms invest in cooperative
advertising, the ﬁrst best policy is the combination of trade tax and advertising
subsidy. If µ<2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, i.e., in the subsequent game Bertrand ﬁrms invest in
predatory advertising, the optimal industrial policy is an advertising subsidy,
whereas the optimal trade policy is ambiguous.
3. Irrespective of the form of market competition and type of advertising, optimal
ﬁrst-best policy never involves taxes on both exports and advertising.
We also have the following Corollaries.
Corollary 5 The cross derivative of the welfare function is negative whatever the
form of competition and whatever the equilibrium type of advertising investment,
∂2W
∂s∂τ
< 0.
That is the two policy instruments are substitutes.
Corollary 6 When ﬁrms play Cournot,
∂W
∂s
¯
¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
> 0.
When ﬁrms play Bertrand, sign ∂W
∂s
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0) is indeﬁnite.
Corollary 7 Whatever the form of competition and the equilibrium type of advertis-
ing investment,
∂W
∂τ
¯ ¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
> 0.
Corollary 8
121. The marginal rate of substitution between trade policy and industrial policy
(thereafter MRS), which is deﬁned by
−
dτ
ds
=
∂W
∂s
∂W
∂τ
,
is positive at the non-intervention point when ﬁrms play Cournot, whereas it
can be positive or negative at that point when ﬁrms play Bertrand (see Figure
1,2 ) .
2. The MRS is decreasing at the non-intervention point, i.e.,
−
d2τ
ds2
¯
¯ ¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
< 0,
whatever the form of competition and whatever the equilibrium type of advertis-
ing investment.
Figure 1: Positive MRS at non-intervention point
13Figure 2: Negative MRS at non-intervention point
Obviously, the results on ﬁrst best policy combination are not clear-cut. This is be-
cause the two policy instruments are substitutes, as stated in Corollary 5. Moreover,
the substitutability between them is dependent on the fundamental characteristics
o ft h em o d e l ,i . e . ,t h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation, the relative eﬀectiveness of
cooperative advertising and the coeﬃcient of investment cost. However, note that
whatever the form of competition and whatever the equilibrium type of advertising
investment, the two policy instruments cannot both be zero, so the government always
wants to play an active role in international competition and its optimal intervention
includes at least one positive component, i.e., a subsidy.
Corollary 8 is the key to understanding the link between the ﬁrst-best and the
second best results, to which we now turn.
4.2 Second best policy analysis
4.2.1 Trade policy
In this case, the government can use only trade policy to intervene in international
competition. Given the equilibrium outcome in the subsequent game, the government
maximizes its welfare:
max
{s}
W (s)=πi (s) − sxi (s).
The following condition characterizes the optimal policy:
dW
ds
=
dπi
ds
(·) − xi −
dxi
ds
s =0 . (15)
14We have
s =
dπi
ds (·) − xi
dxi
ds
. (16)
Applying this general formula for second best trade policy to the particular cases, we
obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 9 In a Brander-Spencer third-country world where the government can
use only trade policy, the unique unilateral intervention by the government of country
i is as follows:
1. If µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, i.e., in the subsequent game both Cournot and Bertrand ﬁrms
invest in cooperative advertising, the optimal trade policy is to implement a
trade subsidy whatever the form of product market competition, if
hp
(5b2 − 1) − (b − 1)
i
k3 >k .
2. If 2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1 >µ>2b+1
2b−1, i.e., in the subsequent game Cournot and Bertrand ﬁrms
will invest in cooperative and predatory advertising respectively, the optimal
trade policy is to implement a trade subsidy whatever the form of product market
competition, if hp
(5b2 − 1) + (b +1 )
i
k4 >k .
3. If 2b+1
2b−1 >µ ,i.e., in the subsequent game both Cournot and Bertrand ﬁrms
invest in predatory advertising, the optimal trade policy is to implement a trade
subsidy whatever the form of product market competition, if
hp
(5b2 − 1) + (b +1 )
i
k4 >k .
4. In all three cases if we do not get robust trade policy, then optimal trade policy is
a trade subsidy with Cournot behaviour and a trade tax with Bertrand behaviour.
Of course, the magnitude of policy instrument is not necessarily the same in each
scenario.
4.2.2 Industrial policy
In this case, the government can use only industrial policy τ to intervene in inter-
national competition. Given the equilibrium outcome in the subsequent game, the
government maximizes its welfare:
max
{τ}
W (τ)=πi (τ) − τIi (τ).
15The following condition characterizes the optimal policy:
dW
dτ
=
dπi
dτ
(·) − Ii −
dIi
dτ
τ =0 . (17)
We have
τ =
dπi
dτ (·) − Ii
dIi
dτ
. (18)
We apply this general formula for second best industrial policy to the particular cases
to obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 10 In a Brander-Spencer third-country world where the government
can implement only industrial policy the unique unilateral intervention is an adver-
tising subsidy, whatever the form of product market competition and whatever the
equilibrium type of advertising investment.
Of course, the magnitude of policy instrument is not necessarily the same in each
scenario.
4.2.3 Discussion
Proposition 10 provides further support for the robustness of industrial policy. But
the results presented in Proposition 9 about the robustness of trade policy seem to
be new in the strategic trade literature. To see the rationale for these results we
refer again to Figures 1 and 2. W0 is the non-intervention welfare level. According
to the second part of Corollary 8, the upper contour set {(s,τ) ∈ R2 : W(s,τ) ≥ W0}
must be “above” the iso-welfare curve, which passes the non-intervention point in the
neighbourhood of that point. Therefore, if the government is restrained to maximize
its welfare along the vertical axis it is clear that the optimal policy must be an
advertising subsidy whatever the form of competition and whatever the equilibrium
type of advertising investment.
Things are a bit more complex in the trade policy case. From the above ﬁgures,
we see that if the MRS in the neighbourhood of the non-intervention point is positive,
then the robust trade policy, i.e., a trade subsidy occurs. It turns out that in the
Cournot case, the MRSs are always positive, whereas those in the Bertrand case can
be positive or negative. When conditions presented in Proposition 9 are satisﬁed,
MRSs in the Bertrand case will be positive and robust trade policy in the form of a
trade subsidy will be observed.17
17In summary, if the MRS is decreasing at the non-intervention point, the robust industrial policy,
i.e., an industrial subsidy will be observed. If the MRS is both positive and decreasing at the non-
intervention point, both an industrial subsidy and the robust trade policy, i.e., a trade subsidy will
be observed.
In addition, if MRS is inﬁnity at the non-intervention point, the second best industrial policy will
be non-intervention. If MRS is zero at the non-intervention point, the second best trade policy will
be a free trade one.
164.2.4 Simulation results on robust trade policy
Proposition 9 established for each of the three cases a critical value of k, kc, such that
if k<k c trade policy is robust. In this section we want to ask: how “large” is the
range of k for which trade policy is robust. To answer this question we ﬁrst make it
more precise, and then present some numerical results.
Assumption 1 restricted k to lie in the range
¡
k,k
¢
, where k is a function of
parameters a, b and µ. However to prove Proposition 4 we assumed that the welfare
function is strictly concave. In Section 12 of the Appendix we show that if the
welfare function is strictly concave, we must have k>k
00 >k , where k
00 is a function
of parameters a, b and µ. So far we have not said anything about what determines k.
In Section 11 of the Appendix, we derive a value for k, which depends on parameters
a, b, µ and the advertising sales ratio, which we deﬁne as φ. From Proposition 9 we
know that kc depends on parameters a, b and µ. Putting this together, for any set
of parameters a, b, µ and φ, we can calculate k
00, k and kc, and the question we ask
is: for what proportion of the range of feasible values of k,
¡
k
00,k
¢
, is trade policy
robust? We denote the proportion as l ≡
kc−k00
k−k00 , and so our question is how large is l?
It is shown that l is a function of parameters b, µ and φ in the Section 11 of
the Appendix. It is not possible to derive a simple expression for l to show how it
relates to these parameter values. So we have used numerical simulations. We take
100 values of b from the interval (1,6), 100 values of µ from the interval (1,2) and
100 values of φ from the interval (0,0.12). For each of the 1,000,000 combinations
of b, µ and φ, we used Proposition 3 to assign it to one of the three cases. We then
calculated k
00, k, kc and l. Finally, for the sets of parameter values lying in each of
the three cases, we calculated summary statistics of the distribution of l : the average
of l, the standard deviation of l, and the maximum and minimum values of l. The
results are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Simulation results on robust trade policy
Average of l Standard Deviation of l Minimum of l Maximum of l
Case 1 0.462 0.354 0.000 1.000
Case 2 0.450 0.314 0.004 1.000
Case 3 0.671 0.359 0.005 1.000
We deﬁne the case where both Cournot and Bertrand ﬁrms invest in cooperative
advertising as Case 1, the case where Cournot and Bertrand ﬁrms invest in cooperative
and predatory advertising respectively as Case 2 and the case where both Cournot
and Bertrand ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising as Case 3. The proportion of Case
1i s0 .529, the proportion of Case 2 is 0.033 and the proportion of Case 3 is 0.375.18
18If in an parameters combination we had k
00 > k, that combination is invalid. The invalid
proportion of observations is 0.063.
17Two key points emerge from the simulation results. First the average fraction of
the feasible range of values for k for which trade policy is robust is not trivial in every
case. Second, the robustness results are more likely in Case 3 where ﬁrms invest in
predatory advertising and there exists negative externality in investment.
This completes the discussions on the policy implications of the basic model. All
of the results presented in this Section are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of policy implications for an open economy
Parameter Equ F i r s tb e s tp o l i c y Second Second best
combination type best trade policy
of industrial
Ad policy
µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1 C: sign s = sign B1 τ>0 s>0
Coop sign τ = sign B2
B: s<0 τ>0 sign s = sign B5
Coop τ>0
2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1 >µ>2b+1
2b−1 C: sign s = sign B1 τ>0 s>0
Coop sign τ = sign B2
B: sign s = sign B4 τ>0 sign s = sign B6
Pred τ>0
2b+1
2b−1 >µ C: s>0 τ>0 s>0
Pred sign τ = sign B3
B: sign s = sign B4 τ>0 sign s = sign B6
Pred τ>0
Equ: Equilibrium, C: Cournot, B: Bertrand,
Coop Ad: Cooperative Advertising, Pred Ad: Predatory Advertising,
B1 = k − (2b +1 )k1,B 2 =2 b(2b +1 )k1 − k,
B3 =2 b(2b − 1)k2 − k, B4 =( 2 b +1 )k4 − k,
B5 =
hp
(5b2 − 1) − (b − 1)
i
k3 − k, B6 =
hp
(5b2 − 1) + (b +1 )
i
k4 − k.
185 Conclusion and Further Extensions
In this paper, we ﬁrst construct a model of advertising in a diﬀerentiated duopoly.
This is modelled as a two-stage game, in which at the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms decide how
much to invest in cooperative advertising, or predatory advertising or both, and
at the second stage they engage in product market competition. We show that
ﬁrms will invest only in one type of advertising, which is determined by the relative
eﬀectiveness of the two types of advertising and the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
We then use this model to explore the policy implications in the context of a Brander-
Spencer third-country model of strategic trade. We ﬁrst analyse optimal policies when
governments use both trade and industrial policies and show that these policies are
substitutes. We then study optimal policy when governments can use only one policy
instrument and show that industrial policy is robust, i.e., governments will always
use an advertising subsidy irrespective of the type of advertising and form of market
competition. More interestingly we show that for a range of parameter values we also
get robust trade policy in which governments always use a trade subsidy irrespective
of the type of advertising or form of market competition.
It might be argued that this paper does not capture the increasing return eﬀect
of advertising. However, we can construct a similar model to deal with the increasing
return eﬀect of advertising.19 Consider a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms
decide how much to spend on advertising. Then follows the two-stage game described
in Section 2 with two revisions: the investment cost can be an aﬃne function but can-
not exceed the budget set in the ﬁrst stage. Solving this game is straightforward. Our
primary task has been to examine the policy implications for an open economy with
a given market structure. With the introduction of ﬁxed cost, an obvious extension
w o u l db et oe n d o g e n i s em a r k e ts t r u c t u r e . 20
This paper does not discuss bilateral intervention. However, it is a natural exten-
sion of the analysis presented in Section 4 and we will get symmetric SPNE and the
main results will be unchanged. As to other possible extensions, studies of R&D and
strategic trade have not explored the implications for robustness of strategic trade
policy. So, an obvious question is whether the robustness result we obtained in the
advertising case carries over to the R&D case? Finally, Ulph and Ulph (2001) explore
the implications for trade and industrial policy of allowing for full government com-
mitment. It would be interesting to reconsider the policy implications of our model
using this approach.
We hope to report on the results of these extensions.
19S e ea l s oF o o t n o t e7 .
20The classic treatment on this topic is Sutton (1991).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Denote σi =( mi,n i), i =1 ,2. We want to ﬁnd a pair
¡
σ∗
i,σ∗
j
¢
satisfying
π
C
i
¡
σ
∗
i,σ
∗
j
¢
≥ π
C
i
³
σ
0
i,σ
∗
j
´
,i =1 ,2,j=1 ,2,i 6= j, ∀σ
0
i ∈ R
2
+.
Given rival’s choice σj =( mj,n j), the optimal response of ﬁrm i solves the problem
max
{mi,ni}
π
C
i , s.t. mi ≥ 0,n i ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian is
Li (mi,n i,ω mi,ω ni;mj,n j)=π
C
i + ωmimi + ωnini.
21According to Kuhn-Tucker’s Method, the solution is characterized by the following
conditions
2bx
∗C
i
µ
∂x∗C
i
∂mi
¶
= k(mi + ni) − ωmi,
2bx
∗C
i
µ
∂x∗C
i
∂ni
¶
= k(mi + ni) − ωni,
mi ≥ 0,n i ≥ 0,
ωmi ≥ 0,ω ni ≥ 0,
ωmimi =0 ,ω nini =0 .
Note ﬁrst that mi =0 ,n i = 0 cannot be a solution because at that point marginal
investment cost is zero while marginal investment revenue is strictly positive. Second,
if µ 6= 2b+1
2b−1, we cannot have both mi > 0a n dni > 0 because marginal revenues from
the two kinds of advertising would diﬀer while marginal investment costs are the
same.
In particular, when µ>2b+1
2b−1, the marginal investment revenue from cooperative
advertising is the larger one, so ﬁrm i invests only in cooperative advertising. In
fact, by choosing an appropriate ωni, all of the above conditions can be satisﬁed.
When µ<2b+1
2b−1, the marginal investment revenue from predatory advertising is the
larger one, so ﬁrm i invests only in predatory advertising. In fact, by choosing an
appropriate ωmi, all of the above conditions can be satisﬁed.
The above arguments are valid for both ﬁrms. Therefore, the proﬁtf u n c t i o no f
ﬁrm i in the reduced extensive form game is given by
π
C
i (mi,n i,m j,n j)=
½
πC
i (mi,m j) if µ > 2b+1
2b−1,
πC
i (ni,n j) if µ < 2b+1
2b−1.
When both ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising, since
∂2πC
i
∂mi∂mj
=2 b
µ
∂x∗C
i
∂mi
¶2
> 0,
cooperative advertising is a strategic complement. We also have
∂πC
i
∂mj
=2 b
µ
∂x∗C
i
∂mi
¶
> 0.
When both ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising, since
∂2πC
i
∂ni∂nj
= −2b
µ
∂x∗C
i
∂ni
¶2
< 0,
predatory advertising is a strategic substitute. We also have
∂πC
i
∂nj
= −2b
µ
∂x∗C
i
∂ni
¶
< 0.
22Finally, when µ>2b+1
2b−1, the two ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to
cooperative advertising simultaneously determine the equilibrium values of m∗
i and
m∗
j and
¡
σ∗
i,σ ∗
j
¢
=
£
(m∗
i,0),
¡
m∗
j,0
¢¤
. It is easy to show m∗
i = m∗
j. When µ<2b+1
2b−1, the
two ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to predatory advertising simultaneously
determine the equilibrium values of n∗
i and n∗
j and
¡
σ∗
i,σ∗
j
¢
=
£
(0,n ∗
i),
¡
0,n ∗
j
¢¤
. It is
easy to show n∗
i = n∗
j.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Denote σi =( mi,n i),i=1 ,2. We want to ﬁnd a pair
¡
σ∗
i,σ ∗
j
¢
satisfying
π
B
i
¡
σ
∗
i,σ
∗
j
¢
≥ π
B
i
³
σ
0
i,σ
∗
j
´
,i =1 ,2,j=1 ,2,i 6= j, ∀σ
0
i ∈ R
2
+.
Given rival’s choice σj =( mj,n j), the optimal response of ﬁrm i solves the problem
max
{mi,ni}
π
B
i , s.t. mi ≥ 0,n i ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian is
Li (mi,n i,ωmi,ωni;mj,n j)=π
B
i + ωmimi + ωnini.
According to Kuhn-Tucker’s Method, the solution is characterized by the following
conditions
2β(p
∗B
i − c)
µ
∂p∗B
i
∂mi
¶
= k(mi + ni) − ωmi,
2β(p
∗B
i − c)
µ
∂p∗B
i
∂ni
¶
= k(mi + ni) − ωni,
mi ≥ 0,n i ≥ 0,
ωmi ≥ 0,ω ni ≥ 0,
ωmimi =0 ,ω nini =0 .
Note ﬁrst that mi =0 ,n i = 0 cannot be a solution because at that point marginal
investment cost is zero while marginal investment revenue is strictly positive. Second,
if µ 6= 2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1,w ec a n n o th a v eb o t hmi > 0a n dni > 0 because marginal revenues
from the two kinds of advertising would diﬀer while marginal investment costs are
the same.
In particular, when µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, the marginal investment revenue from cooperative
advertising is the larger one, so ﬁrm i invests only in cooperative advertising. In fact,
by choosing an appropriate ωni, all of the above conditions can be satisﬁed. When
µ<2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, the marginal investment revenue from predatory advertising is the larger
one, so ﬁrm i invests only in predatory advertising. In fact, by choosing an appropriate
ωmi, all of the above conditions can be satisﬁed.
23The above arguments are valid for both ﬁrms. Therefore, the proﬁtf u n c t i o no f
ﬁrm i in the reduced extensive form game is given by
π
B
i (mi,n i,m j,n j)=
(
πB
i (mi,m j) if µ > 2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1,
πB
i (ni,n j) if µ < 2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1.
When both ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising, since
∂2πB
i
∂mi∂mj
=2 β
µ
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∂mi
¶2
> 0,
cooperative advertising is a strategic complement. We also have
∂πB
i
∂mj
=2 β
µ
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i
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¶
> 0.
When both ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising, since
∂2πB
i
∂ni∂nj
= −2β
µ
∂p∗B
i
∂ni
¶2
< 0,
predatory advertising is a strategic substitute. We also have
∂πB
i
∂nj
= −2β
µ
∂p∗B
i
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¶
< 0.
Finally, When µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, the two ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to
cooperative advertising simultaneously determine the equilibrium values of m∗
i and m∗
j
and
¡
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=
£
(m∗
i,0),
¡
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j,0
¢¤
. It is easy to show m∗
i = m∗
j. When µ<2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, the
two ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions with respect to predatory advertising simultaneously
determine the equilibrium values of n∗
i and n∗
j and
¡
σ∗
i,σ∗
j
¢
=
£
(0,n ∗
i),
¡
0,n ∗
j
¢¤
. It is
easy to show n∗
i = n∗
j.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Note that
2b +1
2b − 1
−
2b2 + b − 1
2b2 − b − 1
= −
2
(b − 1)(4b2 − 1)
< 0.
T h e n ,g i v e nL e m m a1a n dL e m m a2 ,i ti ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .
24A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
A.4.1 Part 1
Given trade policy s and industrial policy τ,and ﬁrms’ advertising levels (mi,n i)a n d
(mj,n j), in the product market ﬁrm i maximizes
Π
C
i =( ai − bxi − xj − c + s)xi,
ﬁrm j maximizes
Π
C
j =( aj − xi − bxj − c)xj.
The Nash Equilibrium is given by
xi =
a
£
1+µ(mi + mj)+
¡
2b+1
2b−1
¢
(ni − nj)
¤
− c
2b +1
+
2bs
4b2 − 1
,
xj =
a
£
1+µ(mi + mj)+
¡
2b+1
2b−1
¢
(nj − ni)
¤
− c
2b +1
−
s
4b2 − 1
.
Obviously, the comparative statics results on advertising investments are unchanged.
However, a trade policy has a direct impact on the equilibrium outcome:
∂xi
∂s
=
2b
4b2 − 1
> 0,
∂xj
∂s
= −
1
4b2 − 1
< 0.
Firm i’s and j’s equilibrium proﬁts are
Π
C
i = b(xi)
2 , Π
C
j = b(xj)
2 ,
respectively.
We use that to replace the product market competition stage and get the reduced
extensive form game. Note that ﬁrms’ decisions in the investment stage on whether
to invest in cooperative or predatory advertising are not changed by the policy in-
struments, since, as we have just seen, that decision depends only on the relative
eﬀectiveness of cooperative advertising and the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Case 1 µ>2b+1
2b−1
If µ>2b+1
2b−1 and both ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising in equilibrium, the
equilibrium values are characterized by the two conditions:
2bxi
µ
∂xi
∂mi
¶
− kmi + τ =0 ,
2bxj
µ
∂xj
∂mj
¶
− kmj =0 .
25Taking derivatives with respect to s and rearranging the equations, we have


∂2πC
i
∂m2
i
∂2πC
i
∂mi∂mj
∂2πC
j
∂mj∂mi
∂2πC
j
∂m2
j


· ∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂s
¸
=
"
−
∂2πC
i
∂mi∂s
−
∂2πC
j
∂mj∂s
#
.
Using Cramer’s Rule,
∂mi
∂s
=
·
k1
aµ(2b − 1)
¸·
2b(k − k1) − k1
∆
¸
,
∂mj
∂s
=
·
k1
aµ(2b − 1)
¸·
(2b +1 )k1 − k
∆
¸
,
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk1.
Taking derivatives with respect to τ and rearranging the equations, we have


∂2πC
i
∂m2
i
∂2πC
i
∂mi∂mj
∂2πC
j
∂mj∂mi
∂2πC
j
∂m2
j


· ∂mi
∂τ
∂mj
∂τ
¸
=
"
−
∂2πC
i
∂mi∂τ
0
#
.
Using Cramer’s Rule,
∂mi
∂τ
=
k − k1
∆
,
∂mj
∂τ
=
k1
∆
,
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk1.
Given the equilibrium of the product market competition and cooperative ad-
vertising is the equilibrium type of investment, in the ﬁrst stage of the game the
government of country i chooses trade policy s and industrial policy τ to maximize
national welfare
W (s,τ)=π
C
i − sxi − τmi.
The ﬁrst order conditions are as follows.
∂W
∂s
=
½·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
¸
−
∂xj
∂s
¾
xi −
∂xi
∂s
(·)s −
∂mi
∂s
τ =0 ,
∂W
∂τ
=
µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
xi −
∂xi
∂τ
(·)s −
∂mi
∂τ
τ =0 .
Using matrix notation, we have
· ∂xi
∂s (·)
∂mi
∂s
∂xi
∂τ (·)
∂mi
∂τ
¸·
s
τ
¸
=


nh³
∂ai
∂mj −
∂xj
∂mj
´
∂mj
∂s
i
−
∂xj
∂s
o
xi ³
∂ai
∂mj −
∂xj
∂mj
´
∂mj
∂τ xi

,
where
∂xi
∂s (·)=
∂xi
∂mi
∂mi
∂s +
∂xi
∂mj
∂mj
∂s +
∂xi
∂s ,
∂xi
∂τ (·)=
∂xi
∂mi
∂mi
∂τ +
∂xi
∂mj
∂mj
∂τ .
26We use Cramer’s Rule to solve this linear equation system.
Denote the determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix of the above linear equation
system by D.
D =
∂xi
∂s
(·)
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
∂mi
∂s
=
∂xi
∂mj
µ
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
¶
+
∂xi
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
.
Note that
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
=
·
k1
aµ(2b − 1)
¸½·
(2b +1 )k1 − k
∆
¸µ
k − k1
∆
¶
−
·
2b(k − k1) − k1
∆
¸µ
k1
∆
¶¾
= −
·
k1
aµ(2b − 1)∆
¸
< 0.
Then
D = −
µ
aµ
2b +1
¶·
k1
aµ(2b − 1)∆
¸
+
µ
2b
4b2 − 1
¶µ
k − k1
∆
¶
=
µ
1
4b2 − 1
¶·
2b(k − k1) − k1
∆
¸
> 0.
Next, we have
D1 =
½·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
−
∂xj
∂s
¸
∂mi
∂τ
−
µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
∂mi
∂s
¾
xi
=
·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶µ
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
¶
−
∂xj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
¸
xi
=
½
−
µ
2abµ
2b +1
¶·
k1
aµ(2b − 1)∆
¸
+
µ
1
4b2 − 1
¶µ
k − k1
∆
¶¾
xi
=
½µ
1
4b2 − 1
¶·
k − (2b +1 )k1
∆
¸¾
xi,
27D2 =
½
∂xi
∂s
(·)
µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
−
∂xj
∂s
¸¾
xi
=



∂xi
∂mi
³
∂ai
∂mj −
∂xj
∂mj
´³
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ −
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
´
+
³
∂ai
∂mj −
∂xj
∂mj
´
∂xi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
+
³
∂xi
∂mi
∂mi
∂τ +
∂xi
∂mj
∂mj
∂τ
´
∂xj
∂s



xi
=
( ¡ aµ
2b+1
¢¡2abµ
2b+1
¢h
k1
aµ(2b−1)∆
i
+
¡
2b
4b2−1
¢¡2abµ
2b+1
¢¡k1
∆
¢
−
¡ aµ
2b+1
¢¡
1
4b2−1
¢¡
k
∆
¢
)
xi
=
½·
aµ
(2b +1 )( 4 b2 − 1)
¸·
2b(2b +1 )k1 − k
∆
¸¾
xi.
Because
s =
D1
D
,τ=
D2
D
,
we have
sign s = sign [k − (2b +1 )k1],s i g nτ= sign [2b(2b +1 )k1 − k]. (A1)
Case 2 µ<2b+1
2b−1
If µ<2b+1
2b−1 and both ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising in equilibrium, the
equilibrium values are characterized by the two conditions:
2bxi
µ
∂xi
∂ni
¶
− kni + τ =0 ,
2bxj
µ
∂xj
∂nj
¶
− knj =0 .
Taking derivatives with respect to s and rearranging the equations, we have


∂2πC
i
∂n2
i
∂2πC
i
∂ni∂nj
∂2πC
j
∂nj∂ni
∂2πC
j
∂n2
j


· ∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂s
¸
=
"
−
∂2πC
i
∂ni∂s
−
∂2πC
j
∂nj∂s
#
.
Using Cramer’s Rule,
∂ni
∂s
=
·
k2
a(2b +1 )
¸·
2b(k − k2)+k2
∆
¸
,
∂nj
∂s
=
·
k2
a(2b − 1)
¸·
−(2b − 1)k2 − k
∆
¸
,
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk2.
Taking derivatives with respect to τ and rearranging the equations, we have


∂2πC
i
∂n2
i
∂2πC
i
∂ni∂nj
∂2πC
j
∂nj∂ni
∂2πC
j
∂n2
j


· ∂ni
∂τ
∂nj
∂τ
¸
=
"
−
∂2πC
i
∂ni∂τ
0
#
.
28Using Cramer’s Rule,
∂ni
∂τ
=
k − k2
∆
,
∂nj
∂τ
= −
k2
∆
,
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk2.
Given the equilibrium of the product market competition and predatory advertis-
ing is the equilibrium type of investment, in the ﬁrst stage of the game the government
of country i chooses trade policy s and industrial policy τ to maximize national wel-
fare
W (s,τ)=π
C
i − sxi − τni.
The ﬁrst order conditions are as follows.
∂W
∂s
=
½·µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
¸
−
∂xj
∂s
¾
xi −
∂xi
∂s
(·)s −
∂ni
∂s
τ =0 ,
∂W
∂τ
=
µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
xi −
∂xi
∂τ
(·)s −
∂ni
∂τ
τ =0 .
Using matrix notation, we have
· ∂xi
∂s (·)
∂ni
∂s
∂xi
∂τ (·)
∂ni
∂τ
¸·
s
τ
¸
=


nh³
∂ai
∂nj −
∂xj
∂nj
´
∂nj
∂s
i
−
∂xj
∂s
o
xi ³
∂ai
∂nj −
∂xj
∂nj
´
∂nj
∂τ xi

,
where
∂xi
∂s (·)=
∂xi
∂ni
∂ni
∂s +
∂xi
∂nj
∂nj
∂s +
∂xi
∂s ,
∂xi
∂τ (·)=
∂xi
∂ni
∂ni
∂τ +
∂xi
∂nj
∂nj
∂τ .
we use Cramer’s Rule to solve this linear equation system.
Denote the determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix of the above linear equation
system by D.
D =
∂xi
∂s
(·)
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
∂ni
∂s
=
∂xi
∂nj
µ
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ
¶
+
∂xi
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
.
Note that
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ
=
·
k2
a(2b +1 )
¸½·
−(2b − 1)k2 − k
∆
¸µ
k − k2
∆
¶
−
·
2b(k − k2)+k2
∆
¸µ
−
k2
∆
¶¾
= −
·
k2
a(2b +1 )∆
¸
< 0.
29Then
D =
µ
a
2b − 1
¶·
k2
a(2b +1 )∆
¸
+
µ
2b
4b2 − 1
¶µ
k − k2
∆
¶
=
µ
1
4b2 − 1
¶·
2b(k − k2)+k2
∆
¸
> 0.
Next, we have
D1 =
½·µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
−
∂xj
∂s
¸
∂ni
∂τ
−
µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
∂ni
∂s
¾
xi
=
·µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶µ
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ
¶
−
∂xj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
¸
xi
> 0.
This is because
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
< 0,
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ
< 0,
∂xj
∂s
< 0,
∂ni
∂τ
> 0.
D2 =
½
∂xi
∂s
(·)
µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
−
∂xj
∂s
¸¾
xi
=



∂xi
∂ni
³
∂ai
∂nj −
∂xj
∂nj
´³
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ −
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
´
+
³
∂ai
∂nj −
∂xj
∂nj
´
∂xi
∂s
∂nj
∂τ
+
³
∂xi
∂ni
∂ni
∂τ +
∂xi
∂nj
∂nj
∂τ
´
∂xj
∂s



xi
=
( ¡
a
2b−1
¢¡
− 2ab
2b−1
¢h
k2
a(2b+1)∆
i
+
¡
2b
4b2−1
¢¡
− 2ab
2b−1
¢¡
−k2
∆
¢
−
¡
a
2b−1
¢¡
1
4b2−1
¢¡
k
∆
¢
)
xi
=
½·
a
(2b − 1)(4b2 − 1)
¸·
2b(2b − 1)k2 − k
∆
¸¾
xi.
Because
s =
D1
D
,τ=
D2
D
,
we have
s>0,s i g nτ= sign [2b(2b − 1)k2 − k]. (A2)
A.4.2 Part 2
Given trade policy s and industrial policy τ,and ﬁrms’ advertising levels (mi,n i)a n d
(mj,n j), in the product market ﬁrm i maximizes
Π
B
i =( pi − c + s)(αi − βpi + γpj),
30ﬁrm j maximizes
Π
B
j =( pj − c)(αj − βpj + γpi).
The Nash Equilibrium is given by
pi =
α
h
1+µ(mi + mj)+
¡
b+1
b−1
¢³
2β−γ
2β+γ
´
(ni − nj)
i
+ βc
2β − γ
−
2β
2s
4β
2 − γ2,
pj =
α
h
1+µ(mi + mj)+
¡
b+1
b−1
¢³
2β−γ
2β+γ
´
(nj − ni)
i
+ βc
2β − γ
−
βγs
4β
2 − γ2.
Obviously, the comparative statics results on advertising investments are unchanged.
However, a trade policy has a direct impact on the equilibrium outcome:
∂pi
∂s
= −
2β
2
4β
2 − γ2 = −
2b2
4b2 − 1
< 0,
∂pj
∂s
= −
βγ
4β
2 − γ2 = −
b
4b2 − 1
< 0.
Firm i’s and j’s equilibrium proﬁts are
Π
B
i = β (pi − c + s)
2 , Π
B
j = β (pj − c)
2 ,
respectively.
We use that to replace the product market competition stage and get the reduced
extensive form game. Note that ﬁrms’ decisions in the investment stage on whether
to invest in cooperative or predatory advertising are not changed by the policy in-
struments, since, as we have just seen, that decision depends only on the relative
eﬀectiveness of cooperative advertising and the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Case 1 µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1
If µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1 and both ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising in equilibrium, the
equilibrium values are characterized by the two conditions:
2β (pi − c + s)
µ
∂pi
∂mi
¶
− kmi + τ =0 ,
2β (pj − c)
µ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
− kmj =0 .
Taking derivatives with respect to s and rearranging the equations, we have


∂2πB
i
∂m2
i
∂2πB
i
∂mi∂mj
∂2πB
j
∂mj∂mi
∂2πB
j
∂m2
j


· ∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂s
¸
=
"
−
∂2πB
i
∂mi∂s
−
∂2πB
j
∂mj∂s
#
.
31Using Cramer’s Rule,
∂mi
∂s
=
·
k3
aµ(b − 1)(2b +1 )
¸·
(2b2 − 1)(k − k3) − bk3
∆
¸
,
∂mj
∂s
=
·
k3
aµ(b − 1)(2b +1 )
¸·
(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)k3 − bk
∆
¸
,
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk3.
Taking derivatives with respect to τ and rearranging the equations, we have


∂2πB
i
∂m2
i
∂2πB
i
∂mi∂mj
∂2πB
j
∂mj∂mi
∂2πB
j
∂m2
j


· ∂mi
∂τ
∂mj
∂τ
¸
=
"
−
∂2πB
i
∂mi∂τ
0
#
.
Using Cramer’s Rule,
∂mi
∂τ
=
k − k3
∆
,
∂mj
∂τ
=
k3
∆
,
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk3.
Given the equilibrium of the product market competition and cooperative ad-
vertising is the equilibrium type of investment, in the ﬁrst stage of the game the
government of country i chooses trade policy s and industrial policy τ to maximize
national welfare
W (s,τ)=π
B
i − sxi − τmi.
The ﬁrst order conditions are as follows.
∂W
∂s
=
½·µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
¸
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¾
(pi − c + s) −
∂xi
∂s
(·)s −
∂mi
∂s
τ =0 ,
∂W
∂τ
=
µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
(pi − c + s) −
∂xi
∂τ
(·)s −
∂mi
∂τ
τ =0 .
Using matrix notation, we have
· ∂xi
∂s (·)
∂mi
∂s
∂xi
∂τ (·)
∂mi
∂τ
¸·
s
τ
¸
=


nh³
∂αi
∂mj + γ
∂pj
∂mj
´
∂mj
∂s
i
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
o
(pi − c + s)
³
∂αi
∂mj + γ
∂pj
∂mj
´
∂mj
∂τ (pi − c + s)

,
where
∂xi
∂s (·)=β
∂(pi−c+s)
∂s = β
³
∂pi
∂mi
∂mi
∂s +
∂pi
∂mj
∂mj
∂s +
∂pi
∂s +1
´
,
∂xi
∂τ (·)=β
∂(pi−c+s)
∂τ =
β
³
∂pi
∂mi
∂mi
∂τ +
∂pi
∂mj
∂mj
∂τ
´
.
We use Cramer’s Rule to solve this linear equation system.
Denote the determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix of the above linear equation
system by D.
D =
∂xi
∂s
(·)
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
∂mi
∂s
= β
·
∂pi
∂mj
µ
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
¶
+
µ
∂pi
∂s
+1
¶
∂mi
∂τ
¸
.
32Note that
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
=
·
k3
aµ(b − 1)(2b +1 )
¸·
(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)k3 − bk
∆
¸µ
k − k3
∆
¶
−
·
k3
aµ(b − 1)(2b +1 )
¸·
(2b2 − 1)(k − k3) − bk3
∆
¸µ
k3
∆
¶
= −
·
bk3
aµ(b − 1)(2b +1 )∆
¸
< 0.
Then
D =
µ
b
b2 − 1
¶½·
aµ(b − 1)
2b − 1
¸·
−
bk3
aµ(b − 1)(2b +1 )∆
¸
+
µ
2b2 − 1
4b2 − 1
¶µ
k − k3
∆
¶¾
=
µ
b
b2 − 1
¶µ
1
4b2 − 1
¶·
(2b2 − 1)(k − k3) − bk3
∆
¸
> 0.
Next, we have
D1 =
½·µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¸
∂mi
∂τ
−
µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
∂mi
∂s
¾
(pi − c + s)
=
·µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶µ
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
¶
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
¸
(pi − c + s)
< 0.
This is because
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
> 0,
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
< 0,
∂pj
∂s
< 0,
∂mi
∂τ
> 0.
D2 =
½
∂xi
∂s
(·)
µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
·µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¸¾
(pi − c + s)
= β



∂pi
∂mi
³
∂αi
∂mj + γ
∂pj
∂mj
´³
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ −
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
´
+
³
∂αi
∂mj + γ
∂pj
∂mj
´¡∂pi
∂s +1
¢ ∂mj
∂τ
−
³
∂pi
∂mi
∂mi
∂τ +
∂pi
∂mj
∂mj
∂τ
´
γ
∂pj
∂s



(pi − c + s)
> 0.
This is because
∂pi
∂mi
> 0,
∂pi
∂mj
> 0,
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
> 0,
∂mj
∂s
∂mi
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂s
∂mj
∂τ
< 0,
∂pi
∂s
+1> 0,
∂pj
∂s
< 0,
∂mi
∂τ
> 0,
∂mj
∂τ
> 0.
33Because
s =
D1
D
,τ=
D2
D
,
we have
s<0,τ> 0. (A3)
Case 2 µ<2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1
If µ<2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1 and both ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising in equilibrium, the
equilibrium values are characterized by the two conditions:
2β (pi − c + s)
µ
∂pi
∂ni
¶
− kni + τ =0 ,
2β (pj − c)
µ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
− knj =0 .
Taking derivatives with respect to s and rearranging the equations, we have


∂2πB
i
∂n2
i
∂2πB
i
∂ni∂nj
∂2πB
j
∂nj∂ni
∂2πB
j
∂n2
j


· ∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂s
¸
=
"
−
∂2πB
i
∂ni∂s
−
∂2πB
j
∂nj∂s
#
.
Using Cramer’s Rule,
∂ni
∂s
=
·
k4
a(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
¸·
(2b2 − 1)(k − k4)+bk4
∆
¸
,
∂nj
∂s
=
·
k4
a(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
¸·
−(b − 1)(2b +1 )k4 − bk
∆
¸
.
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk4.
Taking derivatives with respect to τ and rearranging the equations, we have


∂2πB
i
∂n2
i
∂2πB
i
∂ni∂nj
∂2πB
j
∂nj∂ni
∂2πB
j
∂n2
j


· ∂ni
∂τ
∂nj
∂τ
¸
=
"
−
∂2πB
i
∂ni∂τ
0
#
.
Using Cramer’s Rule,
∂ni
∂τ
=
k − k4
∆
,
∂nj
∂τ
= −
k4
∆
,
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk4.
Given the equilibrium of the product market competition and predatory advertis-
ing is the equilibrium type of investment, in the ﬁrst stage of the game the government
of country i chooses trade policy s and industrial policy τ to maximize national wel-
fare
W (s,τ)=π
B
i − sxi − τni.
34The ﬁrst order conditions are as follows.
∂W
∂s
=
½·µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
¸
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¾
(pi − c + s) −
∂xi
∂s
(·)s −
∂ni
∂s
τ =0 ,
∂W
∂τ
=
µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
(pi − c + s) −
∂xi
∂τ
(·)s −
∂ni
∂τ
τ =0 .
Using matrix notation, we have
· ∂xi
∂s (·)
∂ni
∂s
∂xi
∂τ (·)
∂ni
∂τ
¸·
s
τ
¸
=


nh³
∂αi
∂nj + γ
∂pj
∂nj
´
∂nj
∂s
i
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
o
(pi − c + s)
³
∂αi
∂nj + γ
∂pj
∂nj
´
∂nj
∂τ (pi − c + s)

,
where
∂xi
∂s (·)=β
∂(pi−c+s)
∂s = β
³
∂pi
∂ni
∂ni
∂s +
∂pi
∂nj
∂nj
∂s +
∂pi
∂s +1
´
,
∂xi
∂τ (·)=β
∂(pi−c+s)
∂τ =
β
³
∂pi
∂ni
∂ni
∂τ +
∂pi
∂nj
∂nj
∂τ
´
.
We use Cramer’s Rule to solve this linear equation system.
Denote the determinant of the coeﬃcient matrix of the above linear equation
system by D.
D =
∂xi
∂s
(·)
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
∂ni
∂s
= β
·
∂pi
∂nj
µ
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ
¶
+
µ
∂pi
∂s
+1
¶
∂ni
∂τ
¸
.
Note that
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ
=
·
k4
a(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
¸·
−(b − 1)(2b +1 )k4 − bk
∆
¸µ
k − k4
∆
¶
−
·
k4
a(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
¸·
(2b2 − 1)(k − k4)+bk4
∆
¸µ
−
k4
∆
¶
= −
·
bk4
a(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)∆
¸
< 0.
Then
D =
µ
b
b2 − 1
¶½·
−
a(b +1 )
2b +1
¸·
−
bk4
a(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)∆
¸
+
µ
2b2 − 1
4b2 − 1
¶µ
k − k4
∆
¶¾
=
µ
b
b2 − 1
¶µ
1
4b2 − 1
¶·
(2b2 − 1)(k − k4)+bk4
∆
¸
> 0.
35Next, we have
D1 =
½·µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¸
∂ni
∂τ
−
µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
∂ni
∂s
¾
(pi − c + s)
=
·µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶µ
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
−
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ
¶
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
¸
(pi − c + s)
=
µ
−
2ab
(b − 1)(2b +1 )
¶µ
−
bk4
a(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)∆
¶
(pi − c + s)
+
µ
1
b2 − 1
¶µ
−
b
4b2 − 1
¶µ
k − k4
∆
¶
(pi − c + s)
=
·
b
(b2 − 1)(4b2 − 1)
¸·
(2b +1 )k4 − k
∆
¸
,
D2 =
½
∂xi
∂s
(·)
µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
·µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¸¾
(pi − c + s)
= β



∂pi
∂ni
³
∂αi
∂nj + γ
∂pj
∂nj
´³
∂ni
∂s
∂nj
∂τ −
∂nj
∂s
∂ni
∂τ
´
+
³
∂αi
∂nj + γ
∂pj
∂nj
´¡∂pi
∂s +1
¢ ∂nj
∂τ
−
³
∂pi
∂ni
∂ni
∂τ +
∂pi
∂nj
∂nj
∂τ
´
γ
∂pj
∂s



(pi − c + s)
= β



h
a(b+1)
2b+1
ih
− 2ab
(b−1)(2b+1)
ih
bk4
a(b+1)(2b−1)∆
i
+
h
− 2ab
(b−1)(2b+1)
i³
2b2−1
4b2−1
´¡
−k4
∆
¢
−
h
a(b+1)
2b+1
i¡
k
∆
¢¡
1
b2−1
¢¡
− b
4b2−1
¢



(pi − c + s)
= β
½·
ab
(b − 1)(2b +1 )( 4 b2 − 1)
¸·
2(b − 1)(2b +1 )k4 + k
∆
¸¾
(pi − c + s)
> 0.
Because
s =
D1
D
,τ=
D2
D
,
we have
sign s = sign [(2b +1 )k4 − k],τ> 0. (A4)
A.4.3 Part 3
This is implied by the above two Parts.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 5
By the assumption that the welfare function is strictly concave we must have
k
0 =m a x
½µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k1,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
13
¶
k4
¾
.21 (A5)
21See the last Section of this Appendix.
36A.5.1 Cournot competition
F i r s tc o n s i d e rC o u r n o tc o m p e t i t i o n .
Case 1 µ>2b+1
2b−1
Step 1. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂s∂τ
=
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
−
∂xj
∂s
¸
−
∂mi
∂s
=
∂xi
∂s
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
¸
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·),
and
sign
∂2W
∂s∂τ
= sign
£¡
1 − 4b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
12b
2 − 2
¢
k1k − 2b(2b +1 )( k1)
2¤
.
Let ¡
1 − 4b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
12b
2 − 2
¢
k1k − 2b(2b +1 )( k1)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈



1
2(−1+4b2)
³
12b2 − 2 − 2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1+2 b − 8b3)
´
k1,
1
2(−1+4b2)
³
12b2 − 2+2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1+2 b − 8b3)
´
k1



.
Step 2. Consider the ﬁrst root. Let
f =
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2 − 2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1+2 b − 8b3)
´
.
Then,
df
db
=
b
64b4 − 32b2 +4
³
32
√
2b − 8b2 − 8b3 +2 0 b4 +1− 192b
2 +3 2
´
+
1
8b2 − 2
µ
24b −
80b3 − 24b2 − 16b +2
√
2b − 8b2 − 8b3 +2 0 b4 +1
¶
.
From the graph of
df
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
-0.2
-0.25
-0.3
-0.35
-0.4
-0.45
-0.5
-0.55
-0.6
-0.65
-0.7
b
df/db
b
df/db
37we know that f is a decreasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→1+
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2 − 2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1+2 b − 8b3)
´
=
5
3
−
1
3
√
7,
which is smaller than k
0.
Step 3. Consider the second root. Let
g =
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2+2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1+2 b − 8b3)
´
.
Then,
dg
db
=
b
64b4 − 32b2 +4
³
32 − 32
√
2b − 8b2 − 8b3 +2 0 b4 +1− 192b
2
´
+
1
8b2 − 2
µ
24b +
80b3 − 24b2 − 16b +2
√
2b − 8b2 − 8b3 +2 0 b4 +1
¶
.
From the graph of
dg
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0.0125
0
-0.0125
-0.025
-0.0375
-0.05
-0.0625
-0.075
-0.0875
-0.1
-0.1125
-0.125
-0.1375
-0.15
b dg/db b dg/db
we know that g has a critical point and it is a minimum. Take the following limits,
lim
b→1+
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2+2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1+2 b − 8b3)
´
=
5
3
+
1
3
√
7,
lim
b→+∞
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2+2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1+2 b − 8b3)
´
=
3
2
+
1
2
√
5.
It is easy to show that 3
2 + 1
2
√
5 > 5
3 + 1
3
√
7.
Step 4. Therefore, we have
∂2W
∂s∂τ
< 0, (A6)
38if k>k
0.
Case 2 µ<2b+1
2b−1
Step 1. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂s∂τ
=
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
−
∂xj
∂s
¸
−
∂ni
∂s
=
∂xi
∂s
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
¸
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·),
and
sign
∂2W
∂s∂τ
= sign
£¡
1 − 4b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
12b
2 − 2
¢
k2k − 2b(2b − 1)(k2)
2¤
.
Let ¡
1 − 4b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
12b
2 − 2
¢
k2k − 2b(2b − 1)(k2)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈



1
2(−1+4b2)
³
12b2 − 2 − 2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1− 2b +8 b3)
´
k2,
1
2(−1+4b2)
³
12b2 − 2+2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1− 2b +8 b3)
´
k2



.
Step 2. consider the ﬁrst root. Let
f =
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2 − 2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1− 2b +8 b3)
´
.
Then
df
db
=
b
64b4 − 32b2 +4
³
32
√
8b3 − 8b2 − 2b +2 0 b4 +1− 192b
2 +3 2
´
+
1
8b2 − 2
µ
24b −
24b2 − 16b +8 0 b3 − 2
√
8b3 − 8b2 − 2b +2 0 b4 +1
¶
.
From the graph of
df
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0.1375
0.125
0.1125
0.1
0.0875
0.075
0.0625
0.05
0.0375
0.025
0.0125
b
df/db
b
df/db
39we know that f is an increasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→+∞
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2 − 2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1− 2b +8 b3)
´
=
3
2
−
1
2
√
5,
which is smaller than k
0.
Step 3. Consider the second root. Let
g =
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2+2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1− 2b +8 b3)
´
.
Then
dg
db
=
b
64b4 − 32b2 +4
³
32 − 32
√
8b3 − 8b2 − 2b +2 0 b4 +1− 192b
2
´
+
1
8b2 − 2
µ
24b +
24b2 − 16b +8 0 b3 − 2
√
8b3 − 8b2 − 2b +2 0 b4 +1
¶
.
From the graph of
dg
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.6
-0.7
-0.8
-0.9
-1
b
dg/db
b
dg/db
we know that g is a decreasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→1+
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
12b
2 − 2+2
p
(20b4 − 8b2 +1− 2b +8 b3)
´
=
5
3
+
1
3
√
19.
Step 4. Since µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
13
¶
k2 >
µ
5
3
+
1
3
√
19
¶
k2,
we have
∂2W
∂s∂τ
< 0, (A7)
if k>k
0.
40A.5.2 Bertrand competition
Second consider Bertrand competition.
Case 1 µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1
Step 1. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂s∂τ
=
∂pi
∂τ
(·)
½·µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
¸
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¾
−
∂mi
∂s
·
∂pi
∂s
(·)+1
¸µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·),
and
sign
∂2W
∂s∂τ
= sign
£¡
1 − 4b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
12b
2 − 4
¢
k3k − 2(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)(k3)
2¤
.
Let ¡
1 − 4b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
12b
2 − 4
¢
k3k − 2(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)(k3)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈



1
2(−1+4b2)
³
−4+1 2 b2 − 2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 +2 b − 8b3)
´
k3,
1
2(−1+4b2)
³
−4+1 2 b2 +2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 +2 b − 8b3)
´
k3



.
Step 2. Consider the ﬁrst root. Let
f =
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
−4+1 2 b
2 − 2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 +2 b − 8b3)
´
.
Then
df
db
=
b
64b4 − 32b2 +4
³
32
√
2
√
b − 6b2 − 4b3 +1 0 b4 +1− 192b
2 +6 4
´
+
1
8b2 − 2
µ
24b −
√
2
40b3 − 12b2 − 12b +1
√
b − 6b2 − 4b3 +1 0 b4 +1
¶
.
From the graph of
df
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
-0.2
-0.25
-0.3
-0.35
-0.4
-0.45
-0.5
-0.55
-0.6
b
df/db
b
df/db
41we know that f is a decreasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→1+
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
−4+1 2 b
2 − 2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 +2 b − 8b3)
´
=
2
3
,
which is smaller than k
0.
Step 3. Consider the second root. Let
g =
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
−4+1 2 b
2 +2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 +2 b − 8b3)
´
.
Then
dg
db
=
b
64b4 − 32b2 +4
³
64 − 32
√
2
√
b − 6b2 − 4b3 +1 0 b4 +1− 192b
2
´
+
1
8b2 − 2
µ
24b +
√
2
40b3 − 12b2 − 12b +1
√
b − 6b2 − 4b3 +1 0 b4 +1
¶
.
From the graph of
dg
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
1.5
1.375
1.25
1.125
1
0.875
0.75
0.625
0.5
0.375
0.25
0.125
b
dg/db
b
dg/db
we know that g is an increasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→+∞
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
−4+1 2 b
2 +2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 +2 b − 8b3)
´
=
3
2
+
1
2
√
5.
Step 4. Hence,
∂2W
∂s∂τ
< 0, (A8)
if k>k
0.
Case 2 µ<2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1
Step 1. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂s∂τ
=
∂pi
∂τ
(·)
½·µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
¸
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¾
−
∂ni
∂s
·
∂pi
∂s
(·)+1
¸µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
−
∂xi
∂τ
(·),
42and
sign
∂2W
∂s∂τ
= sign
£¡
1 − 4b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
12b
2 − 4
¢
k4k − 2(b − 1)(2b +1 )( k4)
2¤
.
Let ¡
1 − 4b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
12b
2 − 4
¢
k4k − 2(b − 1)(2b +1 )( k4)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈



1
2(−1+4b2)
³
−4+1 2 b2 − 2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 − 2b +8 b3)
´
k4,
1
2(−1+4b2)
³
−4+1 2 b2 +2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 − 2b +8 b3)
´
k4



.
Step 2. Consider the ﬁrst root. Let
f =
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
−4+1 2 b
2 − 2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 − 2b +8 b3)
´
.
Then
df
db
=
b
64b4 − 32b2 +4
³
32
√
2
√
4b3 − 6b2 − b +1 0 b4 +1− 192b
2 +6 4
´
+
1
8b2 − 2
µ
24b −
√
2
12b2 − 12b +4 0 b3 − 1
√
4b3 − 6b2 − b +1 0 b4 +1
¶
.
From the graph of
df
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
b
df/db
b
df/db
we know that f is an increasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→+∞
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
−4+1 2 b
2 − 2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 − 2b +8 b3)
´
=
3
2
−
1
2
√
5,
which is smaller than k
0.
Step 3. Consider the second root. Let
g =
1
2(−1+4 b2)
³
−4+1 2 b
2 +2
p
(2 − 12b2 +2 0 b4 − 2b +8 b3)
´
.
43Then
dg
db
=
b
64b4 − 32b2 +4
³
64 − 32
√
2
√
4b3 − 6b2 − b +1 0 b4 +1− 192b
2
´
+
1
8b2 − 2
µ
24b +
√
2
12b2 − 12b +4 0 b3 − 1
√
4b3 − 6b2 − b +1 0 b4 +1
¶
.
From the graph of
dg
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0.1375
0.125
0.1125
0.1
0.0875
0.075
0.0625
0.05
0.0375
0.025
0.0125
0
-0.0125
b
dg/db
b
dg/db
we know that g has a critical point and it is a maximum. In addition, the critical
point is b =1 .5253, and
g|b=1.5253 =2 .6891.
Step 4. Since µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
13
¶
k4 > (2.6891)k4,
we have
∂2W
∂s∂τ
< 0, (A9)
if k>k
0.
A.6 Proof of Corollary 6
F i r s tc o n s i d e rC o u r n o tc a s e .
1. When both ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising in equilibrium,
∂W
∂s
¯
¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
=
½·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
¸
−
∂xj
∂s
¾
xi
=
µ
1
4b2 − 1
¶½
2bk1 [(2b +1 )k1 − k]+∆
∆
¾
xi
> 0,
44where ∆ = k2 − 2kk1, and note that
2bk1 [(2b +1 )k1 − k]+∆ =[ k − (b +1 )k1]
2 +
¡
3b
2 − 1
¢
(k1)
2 > 0.
2. When both ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising in equilibrium,
∂W
∂s
¯ ¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
=
½·µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
¸
−
∂xj
∂s
¾
xi > 0,
because
³
∂ai
∂nj −
∂xj
∂nj
´
< 0,
∂nj
∂s < 0,
∂xj
∂s < 0.
Next, consider Bertrand case.
1. When both ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising in equilibrium,
∂W
∂s
¯
¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
=
½·µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
¸
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¾
(pi − c + s)
=
·
b
(b2 − 1)(4b2 − 1)
¸½
2k3 [(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)k3 − bk] − ∆
∆
¾
(pi − c + s),
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk3. Because
2k3 [(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)k3 − bk] − ∆ =
¡
5b
2 − 1
¢
(k3)
2 − [k +( b − 1)k3]
2 ,
we have



sign ∂W
∂s
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0) > 0 if
hp
(5b2 − 1) − (b − 1)
i
k3 >k ,
sign ∂W
∂s
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0) < 0 if
hp
(5b2 − 1) − (b − 1)
i
k3 <k .
2. When both ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising in equilibrium,
∂W
∂s
¯
¯ ¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
=
½·µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
¸
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¾
(pi − c + s)
=
·
b
(b2 − 1)(4b2 − 1)
¸½
2k4 [(b − 1)(2b +1 )k4 + bk] − ∆
∆
¾
(pi − c + s),
where ∆ = k2 − 2kk4. Because
2k4 [(b − 1)(2b +1 )k4 + bk] − ∆ =
¡
5b
2 − 1
¢
(k4)
2 − [k − (b +1 ) k4]
2 ,
we have



sign ∂W
∂s
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0) > 0 if
hp
(5b2 − 1) + (b +1 )
i
k3 >k ,
sign ∂W
∂s
¯ ¯
(s,τ)=(0,0) < 0 if
hp
(5b2 − 1) + (b +1 )
i
k3 <k .
45A.7 Proof of Corollary 7
F i r s tc o n s i d e rC o u r n o tc a s e .
1. When both ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising in equilibrium,
∂W
∂τ
¯ ¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
=
µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
xi > 0,
because
³
∂ai
∂mj −
∂xj
∂mj
´
> 0,
∂mj
∂τ > 0.
2. When both ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising in equilibrium,
∂W
∂τ
¯ ¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
=
µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
xi > 0,
because
³
∂ai
∂nj −
∂xj
∂nj
´
< 0,
∂nj
∂τ < 0.
Next consider Bertrand case.
1. When both ﬁrms invest in cooperative advertising in equilibrium,
∂W
∂τ
¯
¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
=
µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
(pi − c + s) > 0,
because
³
∂αi
∂mj + γ
∂pj
∂mj
´
> 0,
∂mj
∂τ > 0.
2. When both ﬁrms invest in predatory advertising in equilibrium,
∂W
∂τ
¯
¯
¯
¯
(s,τ)=(0,0)
=
µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
(pi − c + s) > 0,
because
³
∂αi
∂nj + γ
∂pj
∂nj
´
< 0,
∂nj
∂τ < 0.
A.8 Proof of Corollary 8
1. It is implied by Corollary 6 and 7.
2. Note that
−
d2τ
ds2 =
∂2W
∂s2
¡
∂W
∂τ
¢2 − 2∂2W
∂s∂τ
∂W
∂s
∂W
∂τ + ∂2W
∂τ2
¡
∂W
∂s
¢2
¡
∂W
∂τ
¢3
By the assumption that the welfare function is strictly concave it is strictly
quasiconcave. Hence, ∂2W
∂s2
¡
∂W
∂τ
¢2−2∂2W
∂s∂τ
∂W
∂s
∂W
∂τ + ∂2W
∂τ2
¡
∂W
∂s
¢2 < 0. This fact and
Corollary 7 imply decreasing marginal rate of substitution at non-intervention
point.
46A.9 Proof of Proposition 9
Note that the second best trade policy analysis is equivalent to the constraint-
augmented ﬁrst best policy analysis where the constraint is τ =0 . Therefore, this
Proposition is implied by Corollary 6.
A.10 Proof of Proposition 10
Note that the second best industrial policy analysis is equivalent to the constraint-
augmented ﬁrst best policy analysis where the constraint is s =0 . Therefore, this
Proposition is implied by Corollary 7.
A.11 The Simulation Design
A.11.1 The general form of “robust” fraction
Denote l the fraction of the feasible range of values for k for which trade policy is
robust. The general form of l can be written as follows.
l =
kc − k
00
k − k
00 =



0 if kc <k
00,
l ∈ (0,1) if k
00 <k c < k,
1 if kc > k.
We have
kc ∈ {k5,k 6},
where
k5 =
hp
(5b2 − 1) − (b − 1)
i
k3,k 6 =
hp
(5b2 − 1) + (b +1 )
i
k4,
and
k
00 =m a x
½³
1+
√
2
´
k1,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
13
¶
k4
¾
.22
Note that when l =0 , we cannot get robust trade policy in equilibrium. In par-
ticular, when ﬁrms play Cournot, optimal trade policy is a subsidy while ﬁrms play
Bertrand, it is a tax. When l =1 , we can deﬁnitely get robust trade policy in equi-
librium and it is a trade subsidy whatever the form of product market competition.
A.11.2 Calibrating k
We use the advertising to sales ratios to calibrate k.
First, deﬁne a ﬁrm’s advertising cost to proﬁtr a t i oκi as the proportion of total
a d v e r t i s i n gi n v e s t m e n tc o s ti ni t sp r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁt.
22See the last Subsection of this Appendix.
471. When ﬁrms play Cournot and in equilibrium invest in cooperative advertising,
the advertising cost to proﬁt ratio is
κ
C
i (m)=κ
C(m)=
k1
k
.
2. When ﬁrms play Cournot and in equilibrium invest in predatory advertising,
the advertising cost to proﬁt ratio is
κ
C
i (n)=κ
C(n)=
k2
k
.
3. When ﬁrms play Bertrand and in equilibrium invest in cooperative advertising,
the advertising cost to proﬁt ratio is
κ
B
i (m)=κ
B(m)=
k3
k
.
4. When ﬁrms play Bertrand and in equilibrium invest in predatory advertising,
the advertising cost to proﬁt ratio is
κ
B
i (n)=κ
B(n)=
k4
k
.
It can be easily shown that
κ
C(m) >κ
B(m),κ
C(n) <κ
B(n).
Next, how do we use the above results to impose an “appropriate” upper bound
on k? First, in empirical work, industrial organization economists often care about
advertising to sales ratios, which is smaller than advertising cost to proﬁt ratio. Given
this fact, it is possible to calibrate four upper bounds for k using the data collected
from the real world or the estimation results of empirical researches.
In particular, if in a given industry, the advertising to sales ratio is φ, then
1. if ﬁrms play Cournot and in equilibrium invest in cooperative advertising, we
must have k1
k >φ .So, the upper bound calibrated should be k1
φ ,
2. if ﬁrms play Cournot and in equilibrium invest in predatory advertising, we
must have k2
k >φ .So, the upper bound calibrated should be k2
φ ,
3. if ﬁrms play Bertrand and in equilibrium invest in cooperative advertising, we
must have k3
k >φ .So, the upper bound calibrated should be k3
φ ,
4. if ﬁrms play Bertrand and in equilibrium invest in predatory advertising, we
must have k4
k >φ .So, the upper bound calibrated should be k4
φ .
48In the simulation, we treat
k =
min{k2,k 3}
φ
,
as the upper bound on k.
Why is that? In general, we do not know the market conduct and the equilibrium
investment behaviour of the ﬁrms and what is available is the data or the estimation
result on advertising to sales ratios. Hence, we should follow a prudential strategy that
given an observed φ, whatever the form of competition and whatever the equilibrium
type of advertising, the advertising cost to proﬁt ratio should be greater than φ.
A.11.3 Using k1 to represent ki,k c,k
00, and k
According to Assumption 1, it is easy to show that
k2 =
"
(2b +1 )
2
(2b − 1)
2 µ2
#
k1,
k3 =
"
(b − 1)(2b +1 )
2
(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
2
#
k1,
k4 =
·
(b +1 )
(b − 1)µ2
¸
k1,
and
k5 =
hp
(5b2 − 1) − (b − 1)
i
"
(b − 1)(2b +1 )
2
(b +1 )( 2 b − 1)
2
#
k1,
k6 =
hp
(5b2 − 1) + (b +1 )
i·
(b +1 )
(b − 1)µ2
¸
k1.
Note that we can write kc as follows.
kc = k1δ,
where
δ ∈



hp
(5b2 − 1) − (b − 1)
ih
(b−1)(2b+1)2
(b+1)(2b−1)2
i
,
hp
(5b2 − 1) + (b +1 )
ih
(b+1)
(b−1)µ2
i



.
In addition,
k
00 = k1 max
½³
1+
√
2
´
,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
13
¶·
(b +1 )
(b − 1)µ2
¸¾
,
k = k1


min
n
(2b+1)2
(2b−1)2µ2,
(b−1)(2b+1)2
(b+1)(2b−1)2
o
φ

.
49A.11.4 Simulation on the robust proportion
Given the above results, we have
l =
kc − k
00
k − k
00
=
δ − max
n¡
1+
√
2
¢
,
¡
3
2 + 1
2
√
13
¢h
(b+1)
(b−1)µ2
io
min
n
(2b+1)2
(2b−1)2µ2 ,
(b−1)(2b+1)2
(b+1)(2b−1)2
o
φ − max
n¡
1+
√
2
¢
,
¡
3
2 + 1
2
√
13
¢h
(b+1)
(b−1)µ2
io.
Furthermore, given the values of parameters b and µ, and the data or estimation
results on φ, we can calculate the two potential values of δ and the other three numbers
presented in the above formula. In addition, according to Proposition 3, we can infer
from the values of b and µ that in equilibrium, whether ﬁrms make cooperative or
predatory advertising investments. Hence, we can decide in that case which value of
δ we should use to calculate l.
According to the relationship between b and µ, we can calculate l in three cases,
i.e.,
1. µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1, and whatever the form of product market competition, cooperative
advertising will be present in equilibrium,
2. 2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1 >µ>2b+1
2b−1, and cooperative advertising will be present in equilib-
rium when ﬁrms play Cournot, while predatory advertising will be present in
equilibrium when ﬁrms play Bertrand.
3. 2b+1
2b−1 >µ ,and whatever the form of product market competition, predatory
advertising will be present in equilibrium.
Note that, given b and µ, if we ﬁnd a φ such that the calibrated k is smaller than
k
00, then that case should be ignored.
A.12 Further Discussion on the Second Order Condition of
Welfare Maximization
In the text we directly assume that the welfare function is strictly concave because to
identify the condition that guarantees strict concavity is not easy. However, to explore
the implications of this assumption will prove to be very helpful. In particular, strict
concavity implies that
∂2W
∂s2 < 0,
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0.
This condition could enable us identify a “reasonable” lower bound on k in each case
of policy analysis. As A.5 shows, in the case of ﬁrst best policy analysis, such a lower
50bound help us prove Corollary 5; As A.11 shows, in the case of second best trade
policy analysis, such a lower bound help us do simulation. Of course, like before, we
also have k<k.
A.12.1 Cournot competition
F i r s tc o n s i d e rC o u r n o tc o m p e t i t i o n .
Case 1 µ>2b+1
2b−1
Step 1. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂s2 =
∂xi
∂s
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
−
∂xj
∂s
− 1
¸
,
and
sign
∂2W
∂s2 = sign
£¡
1 − 2b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
4b
2 − b − 2
¢
k1k +
¡
2b
2 + b
¢
(k1)
2¤
.
Let ¡
1 − 2b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
4b
2 − b − 2
¢
k1k +
¡
2b
2 + b
¢
(k1)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈



1
2(−1+2b2)
³
−b +4 b2 − 2 −
p
(−23b2 +3 2 b4 +4 )
´
k1,
1
2(−1+2b2)
³
−b +4 b2 − 2+
p
(−23b2 +3 2 b4 +4 )
´
k1



.
Step 2. Consider the ﬁrst root. Let
f =
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
−b +4 b
2 − 2 −
p
(−23b2 +3 2 b4 +4 )
´
.
Then
df
db
=
b
16b4 − 16b2 +4
³
8b − 32b
2 +8
√
32b4 − 23b2 +4+1 6
´
+
1
4b2 − 2
µ
8b −
1
2
128b3 − 46b
√
32b4 − 23b2 +4
− 1
¶
.
From the graph of
df
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
3
2.75
2.5
2.25
2
1.75
1.5
1.25
1
0.75
0.5
0.25
0
b
df/db
b
df/db
51we know that it is an increasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→+∞
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
−b +4 b
2 − 2 −
p
(−23b2 +3 2 b4 +4 )
´
=1−
√
2 < 0.
This implies that we always have
k =
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
−b +4 b
2 − 2 −
p
(−23b2 +3 2 b4 +4 )
´
k1 < 0,
which violates Assumption 1.
Step 3. Consider the second root. Let
g =
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
−b +4 b
2 − 2+
p
(−23b2 +3 2 b4 +4 )
´
.
Then
dg
db
=
b
16b4 − 16b2 +4
³
8b − 32b
2 − 8
√
32b4 − 23b2 +4+1 6
´
+
1
4b2 − 2
µ
8b +
1
2
128b3 − 46b
√
32b4 − 23b2 +4
− 1
¶
.
From the graph of
dg
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0.03
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
-0.005
-0.01
-0.015
-0.02
-0.025
b
dg/db
b
dg/db
we know that g has a critical point and it is a minimum. Take the following limits,
lim
b→1+
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
−b +4 b
2 − 2+
p
(−23b2 +3 2 b4 +4 )
´
=
1
2
+
1
2
√
13,
lim
b→+∞
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
−b +4 b
2 − 2+
p
(−23b2 +3 2 b4 +4 )
´
=1+
√
2,
It could be easily shown that 1 +
√
2 > 1
2 + 1
2
√
13 > 2. The last inequality implies
that Assumption 1 is satisﬁed.
52Hence, we have
∂2W
∂s2 < 0 ⇒ k>
³
1+
√
2
´
k1. (A10)
Step 4. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂τ2 =
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂mj
−
∂xj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
¸
−
∂mi
∂τ
,
and
sign
∂2W
∂τ2 = sign
£
−k
2 +3 k1k − (k1)
2¤
.
Let
k
2 − 3k1k +( k1)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈
½µ
3
2
−
1
2
√
5
¶
k1,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k1
¾
Obviously, the ﬁrst root violates Assumption 1. Hence, we have
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0 ⇒ k>
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k1. (A11)
Step 5. Note that µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k1 >
³
1+
√
2
´
k1.
Therefore,
½ ∂2W
∂s2 < 0
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0
⇒ k>
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k1. (A12)
Case 2 µ<2b+1
2b−1
Step 1. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂s2 =
∂xi
∂s
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
−
∂xj
∂s
− 1
¸
,
and
sign
∂2W
∂s2 = sign
£¡
1 − 2b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
4b
2 + b − 2
¢
k2k +
¡
2b
2 − b
¢
(k2)
2¤
.
Let ¡
1 − 2b
2¢
k
2 +
¡
4b
2 + b − 2
¢
k2k +
¡
2b
2 − b
¢
(k2)
2 =0 .
53T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈



1
2(−1+2b2)
³
4b2 − 2+b −
p
(32b4 − 23b2 +4 )
´
k2,
1
2(−1+2b2)
³
4b2 − 2+b +
p
(32b4 − 23b2 +4 )
´
k2



.
Step 2. Consider the ﬁrst root. Let
f =
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
4b
2 − 2+b −
p
(32b4 − 23b2 +4 )
´
.
Then
df
db
=
b
16b4 − 16b2 +4
³
8
√
32b4 − 23b2 +4− 32b
2 − 8b +1 6
´
+
1
4b2 − 2
µ
8b −
1
2
128b3 − 46b
√
32b4 − 23b2 +4
+1
¶
.
From the graph of
df
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
0.005
0
-0.005
-0.01
-0.015
-0.02
-0.025
-0.03
x
y
x
y
we know that f has a critical point and it is a maximum. In addition, the critical
point is b =1 .0679 and
f|b=1.0679 = −0.302.
Hence, Assumption 1 is violated.
Step 3. Consider the second root. Let
g =
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
4b
2 − 2+b +
p
(32b4 − 23b2 +4 )
´
.
Then
dg
db
=
b
16b4 − 16b2 +4
³
16 − 32b
2 − 8
√
32b4 − 23b2 +4− 8b
´
+
1
4b2 − 2
µ
8b +
1
2
128b3 − 46b
√
32b4 − 23b2 +4
+1
¶
54From the graph of
dg
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0
-0.25
-0.5
-0.75
-1
-1.25
-1.5
-1.75
-2
-2.25
-2.5
-2.75
-3
b
dg/db
b
dg/db
we know that g is a decreasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→1+
1
2(−1+2 b2)
³
4b
2 − 2+b +
p
(32b4 − 23b2 +4 )
´
=
3
2
+
1
2
√
13,
which satisﬁes Assumption 1.
Hence, we have
∂2W
∂s2 < 0 ⇒ k>
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
13
¶
k2. (A13)
Step 4. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂τ2 =
∂xi
∂τ
(·)
·µ
∂ai
∂nj
−
∂xj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
¸
−
∂ni
∂τ
,
and
sign
∂2W
∂τ2 = sign
£
−k
2 +3 k2k − (k2)
2¤
.
Let
k
2 − 3k2k +( k2)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈
½µ
3
2
−
1
2
√
5
¶
k2,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k2
¾
.
Obviously, the ﬁrst root violates Assumption 1. Hence, we have
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0 ⇒
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k2. (A14)
Step 5. Note that
µ
1
2
√
13 +
3
2
¶
k2 >
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k2.
Hence, ½ ∂2W
∂s2 < 0
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0
⇒ k>
µ
1
2
√
13 +
3
2
¶
k2. (A15)
55A.12.2 Bertrand competition
Second consider Bertrand competition.
Case 1 µ>2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1
Step 1. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂s2 =
·
∂pi
∂s
(·)+1
¸½·µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂s
¸
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¾
−
∂xi
∂s
(·),
and
sign
∂2W
∂s2 = sign
£
−2b
2k
2 +
¡
4b
2 − b
¢
k3k +( b +1 )( 2 b − 1)(k3)
2¤
.
Let
−2b
2k
2 +
¡
4b
2 − b
¢
k3k +( b +1 )( 2 b − 1)(k3)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈
½µ
b −
1
4
−
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
k3
b
,
µ
b −
1
4
+
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
k3
b
¾
.
Step 2. Consider the ﬁrst root. Let
f =
µ
b −
1
4
−
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
1
b
.
Then,
df
db
=
1
b
µ
1 − 8
b
√
32b2 − 7
¶
+
1
b2
µ
1
4
√
32b2 − 7 − b +
1
4
¶
.
From the graph of
df
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0.0125
0
-0.0125
-0.025
-0.0375
-0.05
-0.0625
-0.075
-0.0875
-0.1
b
df/db
b
df/db
we know that f has a critical point and it is a minimum. Take the following limits,
lim
b→1+
µ
b −
1
4
−
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
1
b
= −
1
2
,
lim
b→+∞
µ
b −
1
4
−
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
1
b
=1−
√
2.
56These results implies that we always have
k =
µ
b −
1
4
−
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
k3
b
< 0,
which violates Assumption 1.
Step 3. Consider the second root. Let
g =
µ
b −
1
4
+
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
1
b
.
Then
dg
db
=
1
b
µ
8
b
√
32b2 − 7
+1
¶
+
1
b2
µ
1
4
−
1
4
√
32b2 − 7 − b
¶
.
From the graph of
dg
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0.6
0.55
0.5
0.45
0.4
0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
b
dg/db
b
dg/db
we know that g is an increasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→+∞
µ
b −
1
4
+
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
1
b
=1+
√
2,
which satisﬁes Assumption 1.
Hence, we have
∂2W
∂s2 < 0 ⇒ k>
³
1+
√
2
´
k3. (A16)
Step 4. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂τ2 =
∂pi
∂τ
(·)
µ
∂αi
∂mj
+ γ
∂pj
∂mj
¶
∂mj
∂τ
−
∂mi
∂τ
,
and
sign
∂2W
∂τ2 = sign
£
−k
2 +3 k3k − (k3)
2¤
.
57Let
k
2 − 3k3k +( k3)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈
½µ
3
2
−
1
2
√
5
¶
k3,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k3
¾
.
Obviously, the ﬁrst root violates Assumption 1. Hence, we have
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0 ⇒
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k3. (A17)
Step 5. Note that
³
1+
√
2
´
k3 <
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k3.
Hence, ½
∂2W
∂s2 < 0
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0
⇒ k>
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k3. (A18)
Case 2 µ<2b2+b−1
2b2−b−1
Step 1. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂s2 =
·
∂pi
∂s
(·)+1
¸½·µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂s
¸
+ γ
∂pj
∂s
¾
−
∂xi
∂s
(·),
and
sign
∂2W
∂s2 = sign
£
−2b
2k
2 +
¡
4b
2 + b
¢
k4k +( b − 1)(2b +1 )( k4)
2¤
.
Let
−2b
2k
2 +
¡
4b
2 + b
¢
k4k +( b − 1)(2b +1 )( k4)
2 =0 .
The solutions is as follows.
k ∈



³
b + 1
4 − 1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
´
k4
b ,
³
b + 1
4 + 1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
´
k4
b



.
Step 2. Consider the ﬁrst root. Let
f =
µ
b +
1
4
−
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
1
b
.
Then
df
db
=
1
b
µ
1 − 8
b
√
32b2 − 7
¶
+
1
b2
µ
1
4
√
32b2 − 7 − b −
1
4
¶
.
58From the graph of
df
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0
-0.05
-0.1
-0.15
-0.2
-0.25
-0.3
-0.35
-0.4
-0.45
-0.5
-0.55
-0.6
b
df/db
b
df/db
we know that f is a decreasing function. Take the following limit,
lim
b→1+
µ
b +
1
4
−
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
1
b
=0 ,
which violates Assumption 1.
Step 3. Consider the second root. Let
g =
µ
b +
1
4
+
1
4
p
(32b2 − 7)
¶
1
b
.
Then
dg
db
=
1
b
µ
8
b
√
32b2 − 7
+1
¶
+
1
b2
µ
−b −
1
4
√
32b2 − 7 −
1
4
¶
.
From the graph of
dg
db,
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
0.1
0.0875
0.075
0.0625
0.05
0.0375
0.025
0.0125
0
-0.0125
b
dg/db
b
dg/db
we know that g has a critical point and it is a maximum. In addition, the critical
point is b =1 .3229 and
g|b=1.3229 =2 .5119.
59which satisﬁes Assumption 1.
Hence, we have
∂2W
∂s2 < 0 ⇒ k>(2.5119)k4. (A19)
Step 4. Note that in this case,
∂2W
∂τ2 =
∂pi
∂τ
(·)
µ
∂αi
∂nj
+ γ
∂pj
∂nj
¶
∂nj
∂τ
−
∂ni
∂τ
,
and
sign
∂2W
∂τ2 = sign
£
−k
2 +3 k4k − (k4)
2¤
.
Let
k
2 − 3k4k +( k4)
2 =0 .
T h es o l u t i o ni sa sf o l l o w s .
k ∈
½µ
3
2
−
1
2
√
5
¶
k4,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k4
¾
.
Obviously, the ﬁrst root violates Assumption 1. Hence, we have
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0 ⇒
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k4. (A20)
Step 5. Note that
(2.5119)k4 <
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k4.
Hence, ½ ∂2W
∂s2 < 0
∂2W
∂τ2 < 0
⇒ k>
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k4. (A21)
A.12.3 Summary
Based on the above discussions, we may draw a conclusion.
1. In the ﬁrst best policy analysis, the “reasonable” lower bound on k is
k
0 =m a x
½µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k1,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
13
¶
k4
¾
. (A22)
So, in fact, we require in this case k
0 <k<k.
2. In the second best trade policy analysis, the “reasonable” lower bound on k is
k
00 =m a x
½³
1+
√
2
´
k1,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
13
¶
k4
¾
. (A23)
So, in fact, we require in this case k
00 <k<k.
603. In the second best industrial policy analysis, the “reasonable” lower bound on
k is
k
000 =m a x
½µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k1,
µ
3
2
+
1
2
√
5
¶
k4
¾
. (A24)
So, in fact, we require in this case k
000 <k<k.
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